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Do courts treat all types of evidence the same? To the average person, the answer
may seem to be yes . It turns out, however, that there are some forms of evidence
that the law prefers over others. To see this, consider a pair of cases that are, for
the most part, very similar:
Case 11
1 This case is based on Smith v. Rapid Transit (1945), where claimant was struck 
by a hit-and-run bus and based her claim that the bus was the defendant’s solely 
on evidence that the defendant operated 90 percent of the buses in the city. The 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court sustained defendant’s motion for summary 
judgment on grounds that that the base rate statistic was insufficient to make a case 
against the defendant in the absence of more particularized proof of the ownership 
of the offending bus.
Suppose it is late at night, and claimant’s car is hit by a black car from one of two 
ride-sharing companies in the area, A and B. Claimant cannot identify whether the 
car that hit her belongs to A or B, but she can prove that 85 percent of the black, 
ride-sharing cars in the city are operated by A, and that the remaining 15 percent 
are operatd by B. Moreover, each of the other elements of the case - negligence, 
causation, and especially, the fact and the extent of the injury - is either stipulated 
or established to a virtual certainty.
Case 2
Again, claimant’s car is hit by a black car from one of two ride- sharing companies
in the area, A and B. But, unlike in case 1, each company operates 50 percent of the
ride-sharing cars. Furthermore, an eyewitness establishes that the black car belongs
to company B. Assume that the witness is usually reliable during the day; however,
the incident occurs at night when she is prone to make a mistake 25 percent of
the time. Finally, assume that each of the other elements of the case - negligence, 
causation, and especially, the fact and the extent of the injury - is either stipulated
or established to a virtual certainty.
Given the facts of each case, our confidence that a vehicle from Company A hit
claimant in the first case is 0.85; but our confidence that a veheicle from Company
B hit claimaint in the second case is only 0.75.2
2 Some might argue that our credence in the second case is not actually 0.75. On 
this view, credences ought to take into account the total available evidence and since 
each case presents a piece of evidence, the claimant’s credence in case 2 that company 
B is at fault should reflect the evidence each case offers. But this is orthogonal to 
the key question that is addressed in this paper. Thus, I shall treat the two cases 
separately. This means that the credence produced in case 2 will not depend on any 
information available in case 1, and vice versa.
Despite the probative value of the first case being higher than that in the second, 
in a set of experiments where subjects were given a pair of similar cases, Gary Wells 
(1992) shows that many people, judges and lay people alike, are open to finding for 
the claimant in the second case, but not in the first. The unequal treatement of 
both cases even extends to the law. Most courts would throw out the first case while 
letting the other case go to trial. The main reason for the different treatment of each 
case centers on the type of evidence that each claimant appeals to. To be sure, the 
claimant in the second case relies on eyewitness testimonial evidence. This type of 
evidence is an instance of individualized evidence - viz., evidence that is specific to 
the individual. But, the claimant in the first case rests solely on bare (or, naked) 
statistical evidence.
Discussions of what marks the distinction between individual and bare statistical 
evidence has garnered some attention in epistemology. Proposals abound in ex-
plaining what makes one piece of evidence individualized and not another. In what 
follows, I show that several prominent frameworks in the literature do not have de-
sirable properties that we might want in a theory of individualized evidence. I then 
defend a novel approach based primarily on a relevant alternatives account of knowl-
edge view in epistemology. The view, as I will show, does possess several properties 
that are significant for a theory of individualized evidence.
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Six years ago, I signed up for a graduate seminar on reasoning in the law, which 
was taught by Jeff Horty. At the time, my goal was modest: I aimed to learn about 
the applications of epistemology and logic to evidence law theory. I had no idea that 
the class would spark a deep-seated interest in me that would shape the direction in 
which I would go in my dissertation. In more ways than one, the course was deeply 
enriching. I wrote a paper that eventually led to a publication. I also learned of 
proof theories that have been developed to model the type of reasoning that lawyers 
and legal experts do. When Jeff noticed my interest in the literature, he began to 
cultivate my knowledge through non-intrusive means, which ranged from placing 
journal articles and books on reasoning in the law in my mailbox in the Department 
to sending me links to papers and course syllabi that had a reading list of journals 
that I should consult. Much of my knowledge in the literature of philosophy of law 
was initially shaped and directed by Jeff.
By the Spring of my second year, I took, what would turn out to be, my final 
seminar at UMD. The course was a grad-level seminar on Belief Revision - or at, 
least that’s what I thought it was. Eric Pacuit taught the course. Of course, out of all 
the committee members of my dissertation, I’ve known Eric the longest. Prior to 
coming to UMD, he had spent a semester in the Philosophy Department at CMU, 
which overlapped with when I was at the tail-end of my Master’s program in the 
same department. He and I met once a week to discuss possible worlds. We began 
reading Lewis’ and Stalnaker’s possible world semantics. By the end of the semester, I 
had a firmer grasp on the literature of possible worlds. But more importantly, I had
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a newfound appreciation for Math and its connection to Philosophy, thanks to Eric. 
Those were some of the memories I took with me when I signed up to take Eric’s 
class. Little did I know that I would read a paper that would ultimately lead to the 
topic that my dissertation covers. The paper was Belief, Credence, and norms by Lara 
Buchak. In one of her arguments, Buchak asserts that naked statistical evidence cases 
should not be treated the same as eyewitness testimonial cases. I thought her view was 
obviously false. To prove Buchak wrong, I resolved to write a paper that supported 
the plausibility of naked statistical evidence in some cases. After some reflection, I 
titled the paper Is Naked Statistical Evidence Less Secure Than Eyewitness 
Testimonial Evidence?
In the ensuing semester, Aleks Knocks, my then officemate and fellow graduate 
student, informed me of the ICAIL Workshop on ’Evidence and Decision Making in 
The Law”, which would be held in June in London at King’s College. The paper 
that I had written in Eric’s seminar was selected for a presentation at the workshop. 
Despite being allotted a short time to present my work, my time at the workshop 
was worthwhile. Not only did I receive great feedback on my work, but I also learned a 
range of positions on naked statistical evidence. But, as good as my time in London 
was, the greater benefits of attending the workshop were still to come. I forged 
relationships with several attendees of the workshop, one of whom is Henry Prakken - 
professor in Informatics and legal Argumentation at the Law Faculty of the University 
of Groningen. Henry provided some feedback on the paper that I presented at the 
conference. Moreover, he gave invaluable suggestions and insight on another paper, 
which led to a publication. When it was time to select committee members on my 
dissertation, Jeff and Eric agreed to be on the committee. Henry
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also followed suit.
Another person with whom I stayed in touch during my visit to King’s College is 
Marcello DiBello, one of the organizers of the workshop. After discussing it over with 
Eric, I also asked Marcello to be on my committee. He acquiesced and let me know 
that he was sympathetic to my position at the time. Marcello’s involvement in my 
dissertation was nothing short of impactful. On several papers that I wrote, some of 
which I had no intention of including in my dissertation, he provided copious feedback 
in a timely manner. Marcello was also liberal with his time. On many occassions, he 
met with me over skype or zoom to provide specific guidance and support. If that 
wasn’t enough, he even recommonded other types of research that I could pursue that 
related to my dissertation. I will always be grateful for his constructive feedback and 
the high standard that he held me to.
In late September of 2019, my dissertation reached a key turning point. I met with 
Jeff over lunch to discuss where I was in my research. At the time, I was planning 
to submit three separate but related, publishable papers for my dissertation. One 
had already been written, and another was in the process of being written. After 
sharing with Jeff my interest in naked statistics and the range of positions in the 
literature, he then suggested that I consider developing a theory that states when 
it is appropriate to use naked statistical evidence. The suggestion resonated with 
me. Given my interest in the topic, it seemed sensible to write a paper on naked 
statistics. And, what better paper to write than one that shows in which cases it 
may be reasonable to find for the plaintiff who relies on bare statistics? The trouble, 
however, was coming up with a plausible theory that not only explains why naked 
statistics are problematic, but also shows in which cases it may be permissible to use
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them.
My doubts proved correct. Coming up with a robust theory was not easy. Many of 
my ideas hit a dead end. That all changed, however, one cold afternoon in November, 
as I was getting ready to teach an evening class. While thinking about the ways in 
which epistemology can aide and inform issues in the law, it suddenly hit me: the 
problem with naked statistical evidence can be modeled by a relevant alternatives 
account of knowledge in contextualism. That is, in the contextualism literature, 
one popular view of knowledge states that to have knowledge of some empirical 
proposition p just means that the agent has eliminated all relevant alternatives to p. 
Similarly, when the trier of fact finds for the plaintiff, she has done something akin 
to eliminating relevant alternatives to the plaintiff’s narrative.
Although my idea was in its embryonic stage, I ran it by some committee members 
and soon realized that my view needed some work. I subsequently wrote a draft in 
which I argued that, with a few alterations, a relevant alternatives account of knowl-
edge from the contextualism literature has the resources to model what is deficient 
about naked statistical evidence. Through the help of two committee members of 
my dissertation, I learned that Sarah Moss had already written a similar paper in 
“Knowledge and Legal Proof”. For obvious reasons, it was heartbreaking to learn 
that someone had beaten me to my idea. The one consolation, however, was seeing 
that there might be something to my idea after all, if a well-respected philosopher 
won an award based on virtually the same idea. Despite the setback, I decided not 
to abandon my core idea of using a relevant alternatives account of knowledge to 
model a theory of evidence. Instead, I looked for ways in which my view might differ 
from Moss’.
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After a series of discussions with some members of my committee, and with Jeff’s
prodding, I realized that I had enough to write a comprehensive paper that would
constitute the entire dissertation, rather than just letting that paper serve as one
of three papers making up the dissertation. I believe that I have a theory of indi-
vidualized evidence that is sufficiently different from that of Moss’. Of course, my
efforts could not have been reached without the support, insight and cajoling of my
committee. When I think of their collective support and guidance, I am reminded
of a piece of advice that Zvi Bienner, one of my former professors, gave me. After
I asked him how I should approach my graduate education, he succinctly replied:
“Think of graduate school as on-the-job training.” Through the efforts of my com-
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This dissertation attempts to make several contributions to the current debate in
the philosophy of law literature on what constitutes individualized evidence - viz.,
evidence that is specific to the individual. The main question has evolved throughout
time. Initially, the question was put this way:
(A) Why do courts tend to disfavor cases in which the plaintiff relies solely on sta-
tistical evidence (sometimes called naked statistical evidence cases) but not those that
rely solely on eye-witness testimonial (or, other forms of individualized) evidence?
For convenience, some refer to (A) as the naked statistical evidence problem.
Eventually, the above question morphed into a question of what makes statistical
evidence different from individualized evidence. Or, simply put:
(B) What is individualized evidence?
To this second question, people typically respond in different ways:
Some view the question is best answered by appealing to ideas and concepts
from epistemology. Others view the question can be answered by stating
the moral and legal concerns with naked statistical evidence cases that
individualized evidence cases are able to avoid.
And, still others believe that some combination of the first two answers is
where the correct answer lies.
Each response has its own merits. But, the plurality of answers to (B) come at
1
several costs. One worry is as follows: By allowing an array of answers with little 
to no guidelines, it allows authors to speak past each other without much progress 
being made. To curb this problem, the first contribution I make is to offer four 
desirable properties that a robust theory of individualized evidence ought to possess. 
By proposing criteria, I hope to shape the debate and offer a new way in which 
discussions on individualized evidence may proceed.
The desirable properties I propose range from requiring theories to explain the 
exceptional treatment of DNA evidence in the law to requiring that the theories must 
adapt in accordance with the different standards that the case is in. There is even a 
requirement that imposes a restriction on how frameworks satisfy some of the other 
desirable properties. Chapter 2 states the desirable properties in fuller detail.
The reader will be curious to know my own answer to (B). En route to providing 
my answer, I show just how challenging the second question is by stating the numer-
ous answers scholars have given to the question. As David Enoch and Talia Fisher 
note, “A good way to appreciate the depth of a problem is to explore the attempts 
that have been made to tackle it.” (Enoch and Fisher; 2015, 565). My discussion of 
historical answers to (B) is provided in Chapter 3.
My answer to the second question constitutes my second contribution to the 
literature. I develop a theory of individualized evidence, which I call Legally Relevant 
Alternatives (or, LRA). LRA is partly insipred by a recent debate in epistemology 
called contextualism, and is fully explained in Chapters 4 and 5. I conclude my 
dissertation by discussing the other applications of LRA. For example, LRA provides 
a highly plausible response to the Gatecrasher Paradox .
2
Here is a summary of what is to come:
Chapter 1 - “The Problem with Statistical Evidence” - introduces the problem 
with using bare statistics to base a verdict. I discuss two well-known examples that 
illustrate the problem. I briefly mention the myriad of proposed solutions to the 
problem.
Chapter 2 - “Desirable Properties for Individualized Evidence” - proposes four 
highly plausible desiderata that a robust theory of individualized evidence should 
possess. Each criterion is best understood as a necessary condition for individualized 
evidence. I do not claim to have originally come up with the first three properties. 
Indeed, several philosophers of law and epistemologists have discussed these ideas 
or precursors to them. The fourth criterion is my own original contribution to the 
literature as it relates to desirable properties for a theory to possess.
Chapter 3 - “Current Theories” - reviews the literature on individualized evidence. 
This literature has had many contributions from legal scholars, philosophers of law 
and epistemologists. The contributors explain what makes individualized evidence 
different from statistical evidence. In most cases, their explanations amount to a 
full-blown framework of individualized evidence. I explain the frameworks and assess 
whether they are able to satisfy the desiderata stated in Chapter 2.
Chapter 4 - “Epistemology” - marks the start of my positive proposal. I discuss the 
background to my theory by explaining a fairly recent movement in epistetmology 
called contextualism. I then explain the relevant alternatives account of knowledge 
view (hereafter, RAA), which is a popular contextualist approach in epistemology. 
Ultimately, the discussion in this chapter shows the relationship that my proposal
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has with epistemology. It also will make my proposal easier to understand.
Chapter 5 - “From Epistemology to the Law” - unveils my theory of individualized 
evidence: Legally Relevant Alternatives (or, LRA). I also explain in which ways 
LRA from two other theories. The first is RAA, which is the contextualist theory 
in epistemological on which my proposal is based. The other is Moss’ probabilistic 
account of knowledge, which also borrows concepts and ideas from RAA.
Chapter 6 - “LRA and the Desiderata” - attempts to set LRA apart from the 
contemporary frameworks stated in Chapter 3. I show that LRA respects all four 
of the desirable properties stated in Chapter 2. I also deal wth several possible 
objections to my account.
Chapter 7 - “LRA and the Gatecrasher - introduces a legal puzzle based on statis-
tical evidence first introduced by Laurence J. Cohen called the Gatecrasher Paradox . 
I discuss several typical responses legal scholars have had to the Gatecrasher before 
explaining LRA’s own solution. I conclude by showing how LRA can captue some of 
the historical responses to the Gatecrasher.
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CHAPTER 1
THE PROBLEM WITH NAKED STATISTICS
Quantitative evidence has played a role in court decisions. In the sentencing phase,
for example, a judge may use statistics to determine the impact that a lighter sentence
may have on recidivism. The trial phase also admits quantitative information. The
plaintiff may use statistics as supplementary evidence to establish a link between
some harm she experienced and the defendant’s misconduct.3
But, the acceptance of quantitative evidence is not without limitations. Consider,
for example, naked statistical evidence cases, where the only evidence the plaintiff
offers is statistical. In the first half of the twentieth century, where such cases began
to appear in court, many judges deemed it problematic to find for the plaintiff who
only relies on bare statistics. But the doctrinal picture on statistical evidence is a
bit more complex than this.4 Not only have courts deemed statistics irrelevant in
many cases, but in other cases statistical evidence has sufficed for a finding for the
plaintiff. In Turner v. United States (1970), for example, the Supreme Court held
that base-rate evidence indicating that more than ninety-nine percent of all heroin
consumed in the United States is illegally imported was enough to allow an inference
that its possession amounted to possession of a smuggled drug.
3 In this essay, I will refer to plaintiff and claimant interchangeably.
4 (See Fisher et al., 2015, 561)
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Unfortunately, discussions of naked statistical evidence among legal scholars aren’t 
less divisive. Although most evidence scholars believe that it is unacceptable to find 
for the plaintiff in such cases, there is much disagreement on why it is unacceptable. 
One reason for the disagreement can be attributed to their methodology. Scholars 
tend to point to different characteristics of naked statistical evidence as the root 
problem. Such problems are traditionally captured by several examples. Given the 
role that these examples will serve throughout the paper, I will discuss two of them 
now: the Prison Riot Case and the Blue Bus Case.5 It is important to note that 
these examples are imaginary cases, despite being based on actual cases. I will refer 
to them as ’cases’, but this does not imply that they are real, or realistic.
Charles Nesson (1979) introduced the Prison Riot Case. I will use the following 
version.
100 prison inmates participate in a riot and escape from the prison. During the 
riot, 99 of them assault and kill a guard on duty. One prisoner is caught, and 
is prosecuted for participating in the killing of the guard. It is absolutely certain 
that he is one of the 100 prisoners that participated in the riot, and it is absolutely 
certain that 99 of them participated in the killing of the guard. There is no further 
evidence (no witnesses, no CCTV images) that makes it possible to identify the 
prisoners who participated in the killing, and individuate the prisoner who did not 
participate. According to the prosecutor, the evidence that the defendant is one of 
the prisoners who participated in the riot is sufficient for the standard of proof in 
criminal cases, since it establishes that there is a 99% probability that the defendant 
participated in the killing of the guard. (If someone would object that the standard of
5A third example is the Gatecrasher Case, which will be discussed in Chapter 7.
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proof in criminal cases corresponds to a probability higher than 99%, say 99.5%, the
circumstances of the case can always be altered to satisfy this number, for example
by making it 1000 prisoners where 999 participated in the killing of the guard.)
Nesson maintains that the defendant should not be convicted on such evidence.
The plaintiff does not provide evidence that singles out the defendant from other
prisoners.6 It is therefore wrong to find for the plaintiff in this case and all cases
involving naked statistical evidence.7
Finally, Judith Jarvis Thomson (1986) introduced the Blue Bus Case. One version
of it runs as follows:
On a rainy night a pedestrian is hit by a bus and injured. It is certain that the
vehicle was a bus, and there is no doubt that the driver was negligent. Several buses
were in traffic on the night in question, and it cannot be established which of them
hit the pedestrian. Two bus companies—the Blue Bus Company and the Green Bus
Company—operate in the area, so the bus that hit the pedestrian belongs to one
of these companies. Both companies say that they don’t know if the accident was
caused by one of their buses, or by the other company. The Blue Bus Company
has the major market share. 80% of the buses who could have hit the pedestrian
belong to the Blue Bus Company, and only 20% belong to the Green Bus Company.
The pedestrian therefore sues the Blue Bus Company. There is an 80% probability
that the damage was caused by the Blue Bus Company, and the standard of proof
6 (See Nesson; 1979, 1193)
7 (See Nesson, 1985, 1378)
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in tort cases only requires that the plaintiff makes his case more probable than the
defendant’s case (‘preponderance of the evidence’).
Similar to Nesson, Thomson argues that it would be wrong to judge the plaintiff
on the basis of naked statistics. To impose liability on the defendant requires a
different kind of evidence that Thomson describes as ’individualized evidence’8, as
in a witness that observes identifying information of the bus that hit the pedestrian.
Naked statistical does not differentiate the culprit in this way, and is therefore not
sufficient for the burden of proof.
Recently philosophers have weighed in on the problem of naked statistical evi-
dence. Many of them view the problem as epistemic in nature. The contributions
made by philosophers and legal scholars have led to a wide varierty of different so-
lutions to the problem of naked statistical evidence. It has been suggested that it
is a problem of social acceptability (Charles Nesson), individual autonomy (Wasser-
man, Pundik) being a member of the wrong reference class (Colyvan et al.), lack
of a causal connection to the facts (Thomson), sensitivity with regard to incentives
(Enoch, Spectre & Fisher), or normalcy of explanation (Smith).
From the various proposals, the following questions emerge: What is the best way
to evaluate the different proposals? And, is there a better theory that has not yet
been proposed? This paper aims to answer both questions. My main goal is to offer
a theory of individualized evidence that possesses several highly plausible properties,
which cannot all be found in any of the abovementioned proposed solutions. In order
to show the strengths of my theory, it is first necessary to discuss several desiderata
8 (See Thomson; 1986, 203)
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that a robust theory of individualized evidence ought to possess. The next chapter
aims to do that.
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CHAPTER 2
Desirable Properties for Individualized Evidence
2.1 THE NEED FOR DESIDERATA
The debate on what constitutes individualized evidence is plagued by several
issues. One issue seems to be a matter of ambiguity. Simply put, the debate is not
well defined. This concern can easily be seen by a brief look at the various ways in
which the debate has been framed throughout the years. Enoch and Fisher (2015) see
the debate as a question of why courts exhibit a general preference for individualized
evidence over statistical evidence for imposing liability. This then motivates them
to provide an overarching theory of individualized evidence.9 Moss (2021) sees the
debate as a question of what legal proof requires. By framing the debate in that way,
she then proposes an account of legal proof that adapts to each legal proceeding.10
For other contributors, the debate is really a question of moral acceptability. For
Colyvan et al., (2001), for example, the debate centers on whether the amount of
illegal substance found on the date of a convicted felon’s arrest should be used as
an estimation of previous acts of wrong doing.11 Colyvan and colleagues then argue
9 (See Enoch and Fisher; 2015, 564)
10 (See Moss; 2021, 4)
11 Specifically, their concern is about whether prompted by an appellate court va-cating a 
lower court’s decision. The lower court based sentencing for a convicted.
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that it should not be a crime for belonging to a reference class.12
It is important to note that the common thread in each above-mentioned article
concerns the shortcomings of naked statistics. However, it is also clear that the
debate has meant something slightly different to each contributor. We should not
think that this is a problem we can afford to ignore. Not having a well-defined debate
can easily lead to authors talking past each other, which in turn can make it difficult
to assess a positive contribution.
Another issue with the debate on individualized evidence is an issue of guidelines.
Specifically, the debate lacks clearly articulated guidelines or criteria that proposed
solutions must satisfy. Indeed, this issue is related to the previous one. If the debate
is a moving target, then guidelines for assessing positive contributions will also be
hard to set. While the literature is rife with proposed solutions to the debate, there
is no consensus on a set of criteria that a robust theory ought to possess.
The issues I have identified so far have created, among other things, a need for a
set of criteria that a theory of individualized evidence ought to display. The objective
of this chapter is to propose four highly plausible properties that we should look for in
a robust theory of individualized evidence. With the exception of the last property,
I do not claim to have originally come up with the first three properties. Indeed, the
first three properties have been mentioned in several articles in the literature.
felon on an estimation of the total quantity of drugs he is believed to have smuggled
into the USA.
12(See Colyvan et al., 2001, 168-170)
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2.2 DNA EVIDENCE
If a theory of individualized evidence should satisfy several desiderata, then what
are they? More importantly, what makes them good properties to possess. Given the
issues with naked statistics laid out in the first chapter, we might wonder whether
the problems apply to all forms of statistical evidence irrespective of how the data
are generated. When looking at the history of legal decisions involving statistical
evidence since the mid 1980s, a curious phenomenon stands out: Despite the general
approach of inadmissibility of naked statistics, the courts are willing to make an
exception when it comes to a particular type of statistical evidence: DNA evidence.13
The exceptional treatment in the law that DNA evidence enjoys cannot be over-
stated. But how is this possible, given the court’s hostitility towards other types of
naked statistics? What makes DNA evidence different from other forms of statistical
evidence? If a theory of individualized evidence is to reflect how courts handle most
cases of individualized evidence, then it seems reasonable to require it to account for
the exceptional treatment the law renders to DNA evidence. My first desideratum
then requires that frameworks of individualized evidence properly account for the
exceptional treatment of DNA statistical evidence.
Alas, there is a challenge to this desideratum. Many people are unaware that DNA
evidence is a type of statistical evidence. Some may even deny the relation between
DNA evidence and statistics. To motivate the first desirable property, the next
Subsection shows why DNA evidence is seen as a type of statistical evidence. In the
13 (See Roth; 2010)
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Subsection thereafter (i.e., Subsection 2.2.2), I elaborate on the courts’ acceptance
of DNA evidence.
2.2.1 Why DNA evidence is a form of statistical evidence
One context in which DNA evidence is used is, the so-called, ’cold-hit’14 DNA ev-
idence. In such a context, the genetic material found at the crime scene is compared
to offenders residing in the Combined DNA Index System (CODIS) - a computer
network that connects forensic DNA laboratories at the local, State, and national
levels.15 CODIS databases contain DNA profiles of two general kinds: known profiles
and crime-scene profiles. The sources of the known profiles include voluntary sub-
missions and mandatory contributions from certain convicted offenders and in some
cases arrestees.16 Crime-scene profiles are collected by crime-scene technicians and
are evidentiary samples connected to unsolved offenses according to certain stan-
dards related both to the quality of the evidence and the clarity of its connection to
14 Cold hits raise legal questions. Given that it is possible to recover biological
material from well-preserved evidence, many cold-hit cases have arisen from offenses
that occurred years or even decades ago. Unfortunately, clear data on the number,
frequency, and outcome of cold-hit cases are difficult to obtain. Some information
exists, however. In Virginia, a survey of the outcome of the first 1000 cold hits
revealed that 100 resulted in convictions through plea or trial, seven yielded not
guilty verdicts, and 53 were never prosecuted; 752 were pending at the time of the
survey.
15 Ibid
16 (See Butler; 2005)
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the crime.
In many cases, there is a match between the DNA sample taken at the crime
scene and a DNA profile in CODIS. The match is then used as the basis of a crimi-
nal case against the person to whom the matching DNA profile belongs. Although it
is unlikely that a criminal suspect would share a DNA profile with a piece of incrim-
inating evidence by coincidence, quantifying this probability requires estimating the
population frequency of the varying genetic features (alleles) in a specified reference
class, such as a racial or ethnic group.17
In the simplest computation, the population frequencies of each of the varying
genetic features are deemed to be inherited independently of one another. They are
then multiplied together, along with various coefficients, in keeping with the product
rule.18 The result is commonly known as the “random match probability,” and it
is equivalent to the chance of a DNA match by coincidence. It is also the statistic
usually reported to a judge or jury. This statistic indicates the estimated rarity of
the DNA profile, although that specific figure may be misleading if it induces the
fact-finder to ignore the much more likely chance of a laboratory error or errors in
subjective judgments made in interpreting the results.19
17 (See, Lindsey et al., 2003)
18Ibid
19 One component of DNA evidence is extracting, analyzing, and making statistical
inferences from genetic material. Suppose, for example, the perpetrator left a cup 
containing saliva at the scene of the crime. This genetic material is processed in a 
laboratory to build a profile of which alleles appear at which locations on a strand of 
DNA. From this process, DNA evidence is used in different contexts. One is where 
suspicion has already fallen upon some person and DNA profiliing is used to bolster 
against them. This often involves taking further genetic material from a suspect and
14
2.2.2 The Exceptional Treatment of DNA evidence in the law
The number and frequency of cold hits has grown rapidly. In November 2004, the
FBI reported a total of 19,500 cold hits, including both scene-to-scene and offender-
to-scene matches20 by March 2007 that number had risen to over 47,000. States have
experienced similar growth. For example, it took the state of Virginia from 1993 to
2001 to reach its first 1000 cold hits, but the second thousand occurred within the
following 18 months.21
Cold-hit cases have prompted courts to confront the question of whether a genetic
match constitutes sufficient evidence to uphold a conviction. By comparison, the
Supreme Court has previously ruled that a confession, standing alone, cannot serve as
the basis for conviction.22Although it has not yet been fully decided, most courts have
resolved the cold-hit question in the affirmative. As one court observed, “the perils
of eyewitness identification testimony far exceed those presented by DNA expert
testimony”23 And another, while recognizing that DNA evidence is not “infallible,”
testing it against the initial genetic material found at a crime scene. If the samples
match, then this further supports the pre-existing suspicion.
20 NDIS Statistics, FBI, Measuring Success, 2005. Available at
http://www.fbi.gov.proxy-um.researchport.umd.edu/hq/lab/codis/success
21 Murphy E. The new forensics: criminal justice, false certainty, and the second
generation of scientific evidence, 56 Cal. L. Rev. 721, 2007:742
22 (See Smith v. United States , 348 U.S. 147, 152 (1954) )
23 (See Roberson v. State, 16 S.W.3d 156, 170 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000))
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explained that “[v]irtually no evidence is absolutely conclusive”24 Of course, cold-hit
cases raise justice-related concerns, especially since mounting a defense to a crime
that occurred in the past becomes increasingly difficult as time progresses.
Cold-hit cases can vary strikingly in terms of the evidentiary value of the DNA
match itself. This is especially true depending on whether there is corroborating
evidence. For example, such evidence may be weak, as in the information that the
defendant lived near the victim.25 The evidence could also be strong, as in the
defendant matches a detailed physical description given by the victim at the time of
the offense. In People v. Johnson, a 15-year-old rape victim provided descriptions of
the assailant’s car and physical features, including distinctive tattoos, but no suspect
was identified. Five years later, a cold hit identified the defendant, and the ensuing
investigation revealed that he had lived in the area at the time of the offense, had
matching tattoos, and owned a vehicle that fit the description given by the victim.
Courts across the country have also upheld convictions based only upon cold-hit
evidence. In cases of sexual assault, courts have reasoned that the intimate nature
of the sample decisively puts an end to arguments that it might have been left
inadvertently. For example, in State v. Hunter , an appellate court upheld a rape
conviction based on a semen sample collected after a sexual assault in 1995. The
sample was matched eight years later to the defendant, although literally no other
evidence linked him to the crime.26 In sustaining a rape conviction based on DNA
24 (See People v. Johnson 139 Cal.App. 4th 1135 Cal. Ct. App. 2006).
25 (See Riggs v. State, 809 N.E.2d 322 Ind. 2004)
26 (State v. Hunter , 861 N.E.2d 898 (Ohio App. Ct. 2006)).
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evidence alone, another court explained, “we cannot conceive of an innocent reason
for the defendant’s DNA to be found on swabs taken from the victim’s anal area.”27
Some courts have upheld prosecutions based on cold hits not only in the absence
of additional evidence but also in the face of contrary evidence. For instance, in
Michigan, the government tested a biological sample collected from the hand of the
victim in a 36-year-old murder case. The test revealed two profiles: one of the man
ultimately prosecuted for the offense and another of an individual who was 4 years old
at the time of the murder. Despite the unexplained presence of the second profile and
the absence of any additional evidence, the jury convicted the defendant.28 Likewise,
in United States v. Jenkins , the court approved a murder and burglary prosecution.
The conviction was based primarily on genetic evidence, despite the fact that a day
after the incident another man was found in possession of the decedent’s credit cards
and other items taken from the home.29 Although the prosecution was allowed to
proceed, the case resulted in a mistrial.30
In sum, despite the statistical nature of DNA evidence, the history of its usage in
27 Ibid. At the same time, however, the court specifically disclaimed “an iron-clad
principal [sic] that DNA evidence, without corroboration, is always sufficient,” since
“[p]ractically infinite factual variations can arise.”
28 (See Convicted Murderer Seeks Retrial, Kalamazoo Gazette, May 10, 2006; Sect.
Local News)
29 (See United States v. Jenkins)
30 (See Cauvin HE)
17
legal settings cannot be overstated. Ever since its introduction in American court-
rooms in the 1980s, DNA evidence has proved a powerful tool leading to scores of
convictions and post-conviction exonerations.31 American courts admitted DNA ev-
idence in paternity suits32 and in criminal trials.33 Nearly a decade later, most states
have allowed DNA test results to be admitted as evidence in criminal trials.34 In fact,
some state legislatures have passed laws recognizing the reliability and admissibility
of DNA evidence.
So far a strong case has been made showing most courts’ (and even some legisla-
tures’) wide acceptance of DNA evidence. But there are questions that this accep-
tance of DNA evidence raises that must be addressed.35 One question, for example,
31 (See DNA Exonerations Nationwide)
32 (See Gilmore; 2002)
33 The first appellate court in the United States to uphold the admission of DNA
evidence in a criminal proceeding was Florida’s Fifth District Court of Appeal. (See
Andrews v. State). The first federal appellate court to approve of the admission of
DNA evidence was the United States v. Jakobetz .
34 (See Whitmore; 1993)
35 Not everyone believes that DNA evidence cases suce for conviction. Martin 
Smith, for example, has offered a theory of individualized, according to which such 
evidence is one that satisfies normic support. He defines normic support as follows: 
E normically supports p in the sense that if E holds, then p normally holds, and 
so whenever E holds but p does not, an explanation for the abnormality is required 
besides the falsity of p. Smith does not think that DNA cold-hit cases satisfy normic
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can be put as follows: Why do courts give DNA evidence preferential treatment? In 
the next Subsection, I argue that one explanation can be found in, what is sometimes 
called, the Frye test.
2.2.3 Understanding the Frye Test
The Frye test had its origin in Frye v. United States, a 1923 United States 
Court of Appeals decision concerning the admissibility of evidence derived from a 
systolic blood-pressure deception test - an unsophisticated precursor to the polygraph 
machine. Alphonzo Frye was convicted of murder in the second degree. In the course 
of the trial, counsel for the defendant offered an expert witness to testify to the result 
support. To see this, suppose in a cold-hit case the defendant who was incriminated 
by the cold-hit match was someone other than the perpetrator. Furthermore, routine 
sources of error such as mislabeling of the samples, etc., were ruled out. It could 
happen, by sheer coincidence, that the perpetrator and the defendant shared the 
same DNA profile. Smith argues that this would not require normic support. (See 
Smith; 2018, 1212), because no explanation for why the match coincidentally pointed 
to the wrong person is required. Given that such cases do not satisfy normic support, 
this then means that DNA cold-hit cases do not suffice for conviction.
I do not think that Smith’s argument goes through, however. Di Bello (2020), 
for example, argues that Smith’s argument overgeneralizes to other forms of trial 
evidence. Thus, while there is some resistance to readily accept DNA statistical 
evidence as individualizing, it still remains to be seen whether any of the arguments 
is successful.
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of a deception test made upon defendant. The test is better known as the systolic
blood pressure deception test.
The basic idea behind the deception test is that changes in blood pressure would
be caused by changes in the emotions of the witness, and systolic blood-pressure rises
were caused by nervous impulses sent to the autonomic nervous system. Frye argued
that scientific experiments confirmed that pain, fear, and rage usually produced
an elevation of systolic blood pressure, and that conscious deception or falsehood,
concealment of facts, or guilt of crime, accompanied by fear of detection when the
person is under examination, raised the systolic blood pressure in a curve, which
corresponds exactly to the struggle going on in the subject’s mind, between fear and
attempted control of that fear, as the examination touches the vital points about
which he was attempting to mislead the examiner.
The court held that test results that Frye attempted to introduce into evidence
did not meet the requirement that such evidence be “sufficiently established to have
gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs,” and therefore
the test results were properly excluded by the lower court. The court reached its
decision on the basis that though the deception test at issue here has a scientific basis,
“just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental
and demonstrable stages is difficult to define ... [and] the thing from which the
deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance
in the particular field in which it belongs [to be admissible].”36
The reasoning behind the court’s decision in Frye led to, what is now called, the
Frye test, which asks “whether the accepted techniques, when properly performed,
36(See Frye v. United States)
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generate results accepted as reliable within the scientific community generally.” The 
Frye test, in some respects, explains the court’s acceptance of statistical evidence 
generated by DNA research. The scientific community has overwhelmingly found this 
as a reliable method for generating knowledge. The discovery of DNA as well as our 
understanding of its structure and functioning is arguably the most important 
discovery of the 19th century. The impact of the discovery of DNA on scientific and 
medical progress has been massive. Consider, for example, the impact DNA research 
has had on genetics. Owing to the discovery of DNA, geneticists’ ability to actually 
diagnose diseases early on have vastly improved. Moreover, scientists have been able 
to better assess a person’s genetic susceptibility to specific diseases, which have led for 
the opportunityto create new drugs and interventions to treat these diseases. Indeed, 
the scientific commnuty’s acceptance of DNA research as a very reliable method for 
acquiring knowledge has contributed to the court’s acceptance of DNA evidence.
2.2.4 The litmus test for the first desideratum
Our discussion of the first desideratum concludes with a way to assess whether a 
framework respects the requirement. I will use two cases of naked statistical evidence 
to assess whether the framework satisfies the first desideratum. The first is a cold-
hit case and the second is a case the statistics for which are not generated by DNA 
research:
DNA: Suppose a man is fatally wounded at his home. His death is the result of 
compression of anatomical neck structures, which lead to asphyxia. After doing a 
sweep of the crime scene, detectives uncover fingernail scrapings all over the victim’s 
neck. The scrapings enable DNA samples to be extracted and a DNA profile is
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generated. A match is then made between the DNA profile recovered from the 
victim’s neck and a DNA databank of offenders. The match supports a 1 in 1010 
chance that someone other than Defendant ’s DNA was found on the victim’s neck. 
Defendant is subsequently charged with homicide.
Brawl 37: Suppose twenty one employees of a company have assembled to protest 
unfair wages. After being told by a police  officer that they must disband and 
leave the premises because of excessive noise, all but one of the protesters attack the 
officer, who is subsequently injured. Defendant , a randomly selected protester, is 
charged with assaulting an officer.
In each case, there is a greater than .95 chance that Defendant actually commits 
the crime that they are being accused of. However, intuitions vary on whether a guilty 
verdict should be returned for each case. Most people think that Defendant should 
not be found guilty in Brawl , but should be in DNA.38 To explain the exceptional
37 This example is obviously inspired by the Prison Riot Case. My motivation for 
using this example instead of the Prison Riot is that I want to offer a non-DNA-
based case of statistical evidence that, despite generating a high confidence level of 
being in favor of the plaintiff, would still deemed be unacceptable to return a guilty 
verdict.
38 Although I took some effort to carve out, what I believed to be, a convincing 
example involving DNA evidence, not everyone shares my opinion that we should 
find for the plaintiff. Some, for example, might wonder why we think that a guilty 
verdict should be returned in DNA just because Defendant ’s DNA is found on the 
victim’s neck. It seems possible that a number of hypotheses need to be ruled out 
that don’t make it obvious that a guilty verdict should be automatically returned. 
It could be, for example, that Defendant has an identical twin brother who actually
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committed the crime. Given that identical twins share their DNA code with each 
other, this explains why a DNA profile matching that of Defendant’s was found on 
the victim’s neck. Or, it could be that several hours before the victim was brutally 
attacked, he was at a physical therapy session and received electrical stimulation 
treatment on his neck followed by a neck message both of which were provided by 
Defendant . The actual perpetrator who killed victim used gloves and was careful not 
to leave behind any trace. Each example offers a possible explanation for Defendant’ s 
DNA being found on victim’s neck, while establishing the likelihood of Defendant ’s 
innocence. Given these possibilities, as the objection goes, why do we think it obvious 
that Defendant be found guilty on the ground that his DNA evidence was found on 
victim’s neck?
The above examples pose challenges to concluding that the evidence automatically 
establishes that Defendant committed the vicious attacks on victim. But to think, 
on these grounds, that there is no qualitative difference between DNA and Brawl 
misses the point. It is really irrelevant whether or not we ultimately think that 
Defendant in DNA should be found guilty. The point that I am ultimately making 
in DNA and Brawl is that most people, including legal scholars and judges treat cases 
involving DNA statistical evidence very different from cases involving other types of 
statistical evidence even if the treatment in DNA cases does not always result in 
automatically finding for the plaintiff. Sometimes the difference in treatment is seen 
in their willingness to consider whether the plaintiff in each case has standing. The 
point is that if we think that DNA should be treated more favorably than Brawl on 
the basis of the evidence that is appealed to, then this signals that we view DNA 
evidence to be qualitatively different from other forms of DNA evidence.
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treatment of DNA evidence in contrast to other forms of statistical evidence, the
theoretical framework must explain why courts would find Defendant guilty in DNA
but not in Brawl .Thus:
DI The theoretical framework must explain why it is acceptable to find
for the plaintiff in DNA but not in Brawl . (To save space, if the theoretical
framework fails to satisfy DNA, then that will suffice for showing that it does not
respect DI.)
2.3 ADAPTIVENESS REQUIREMENT
A theory of individualized evidence must not only show what makes DNA evidence
unique, it must also show how individualized evidence adapts to different standards
that courts might apply. Jeremy Bentham (1843) was among the first to recognize
that legal proof “admits of, and exists in, different degrees of strength,” where “the
practice of wagering affords at the same time a proof of the existence, and a mode of
expression or measurement for these quantities or degrees”.39 Undoubtedly, the law
imposes different standards of proof, corresponding to the various legal proceedings.
The various standards have implications on the role of evidence. Indeed, the same
collection of evidence that does not meet the requirements for a guilty verdict in one
proceeding may meet the requirements for an imposition of liability in another.
2.3.1 The O.J. Simpson Trials
One historical example of this point can be seen in the civil and criminal trials
39(See 223)
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of Orenthal James Simpson (hereafter, O.J.). After Nicole Brown Simpson’s and
Ronald Goldman’s bodies were found on the steps of a walkway in front of the
former’s condominium, O.J. was charged with two counts of first-degree murder. In
October of 1995, O.J. was found not guilty of all the charges in the criminal case.
However, less than sixteen months later, using virtually the same evidence offered
in the criminal case, the jury in the civil case found O.J. personally liable for the
wrongful deaths of the same victims. What accounts for the different verdicts? The
facts were the same; the defendant was the same; even the victims were the same.
One explanation for the different decisions in the two cases is that two different
standards of proof were operative. Specifically, the standard of proof in criminal
trials is more stringent than it is in civil trials. That is the reason why, holding fixed
stipulated facts of the incident in question, O.J. was found liable of wrongful death
in one proceeding but not guilty of double homicide in another proceeding.
2.3.2 A matter of different standards
One way of understanding the various standards of legal proof is in terms of
probability. According to this view, burdens such as proof by preponderance of the
evidence, proof by clear and convincing evidence,40 and proof beyond a reasonable
doubt41 correspond to probability thresholds, which must be satisfied to return a
40 Burdens such as preponderance of the evidence and clear and convincing evidence
are used in civil proceedings.
41 Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is used in criminal proceedings
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verdict of guilt or liability.42 For example, the standard of proof that is supposed to
be applied in civil trials is the preponderance of evidence standard - also known as the
’balance of probabilities’. To find a defendant liable by this standard, the fact-finder
must judge it to be more than .5 likely on the evidence that the defendant is liable.
A slightly more stringent proof is the clear and convincing standard. According to
a study by McCauliff (1982), many federal judges and United States Supreme Court
justices believe that to find to find a defendant liable by this standard, the fact-finder
must judge it to be approximately .75 likely on the evidence that the defendant is
liable.43 Finally, the strictest standard of proof is proof beyond reasonable doubt ,
which is used in criminal trials. To find a defendant guilty by this standard, the
fact-finder must judge it to be at least .95 likely on the evidence that the defendant
is guilty.
Obviously, the fact that different legal proceedings employ different standards of
proof has bearing on frameworks attempting to explain individualized evidence. It
will not do if frameworks can only accout for one standard of proof, but not all of
them. This means, then, that a robust framework must show that what counts as
individualized evidence adapts to the different standards of proof across the different
standards in the law. Put somewhat differently:
42 (See Smartt; 6, 20)
43 An informal study conducted by Judge Weinstein revealed that judges in the 
Eastern District of New York associated this standard with probability thresholds 
ranging from .6 to .75 for example, and a subsequent study by McCauliff 1982 found 
that hundreds of judges and United States Supreme Court justices associated this 
standard with an average probability threshold of .75
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DII The theoretical framework must adapt to the different standards 
of proof that the courts may apply.
2.4 WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS
2.4.1 The initial basis for the third desideratum
The third desideratum deals with inevitable miscarriages of justice. One notice-
able feature of each standard reveals that none of them requires that the trier of 
fact have absolute certainty that the plaintiff has made her case. Indeed, even proof 
“beyond a reasonable doubt” does not mean that the state proves its case to an ab-
solute certainty. Were such a standard required, then very few criminals would ever 
be brought to justice.
There is, however, one downside to not requiring absolute certainty - it leaves open 
the possibility of miscarriages of justice, where a person is convicted and punished for 
a crime that he or she did not commit. Indeed, in any criminal legal system, a subset 
of innocent defendants is virtually guaranteed to be convicted. Several philosophers 
of legal reasoning agree that an innocent defendant can be proven guilty. As Gardiner 
2019 writes:
[I]t is a desideratum of an account of legal evidence that - if evidence is compelling 
but misleading - the burden can be satisfied even if the judgment is false ... an 
innocent defendant can appear beyond guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
Similarly, Blome-Tillman 2015 argues:
More often than desirable, courts find defendants liable that are in fact not at 
fault. In some such cases of wrongful conviction, the defendant is found liable on the
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basis of very strong but ultimately misleading evidence. In such cases, the court is
not at fault. The standards of proof have been met by strong, if misleading evidence.
Call such cases no-fault wrongful convictions.44
2.4.2 Epistemic justification and the burden of proof
In the philosophy of law literature, some have drawn a link between individualized
evidence and traditional epistemology. Discussions of the connection tend to take
many forms. The most common is to suggest that proposed solutions used in tradi-
tional epistemology, particularly, accounts of propositional knowledge, can aide and
inform solutions to issues in philosophy of law. For example, as will be discussed in
Section 3, Thomson’s causal connection and guarantee argument borrows the idea of
a causal connection, which is central to Alvin Goldman’s causal theory of knowing.
Similarly, Enoch and his colleagues’ sensitivity argument is based on Robert Nozick’s
truth tracking theory.
An often overlooked, but no-less significant, connection is that between epistemic
justification and the legal burden of proof. The similarities are striking. For instance,
epistemic justification is said to be the right standing of a person’s beliefs with
respect to knowledge. Indeed, on many accounts, it is a necessary condition for
(or, constituent of) knowledge. Also, epistemic justification comes in degrees - an
agent can have more or less of it. Finally, justification is also a normative concept.
Determining whether a belief is justified can indicate whether one should , should
not , or may believe a proposition.
Analogously, satisfying the legal burden of proof is also a constituent of a stan-
44(108)
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dard; namely, returning a finding for the plaintiff. Also, similar to justification in 
epistemology, the burden of proof can come in degrees. It can either be met or not 
met. Most of all, assessing whether the burden of proof for a proceeding has been 
met can indicate whether one should , should not , or may find for the plaintiff. Thus, 
in many respects, satisfying the legal burden of proof in philosophy of law is the 
analogue to being justified in holding a belief in epistemology.
If the analogy between satisfying the legal burden of proof and being justified in 
believing a proposition holds, then this has a significant implication regarding the 
third desideratum: Most epistemologists maintain that an agent can be justified in 
believing something that is false. That is, one can have enough good reasons for 
believing some proposition even if the proposition turns out to be false. Simply put, 
epistemic justification does not entail having a true belief. But if being justified in 
believing p does not entail the truth of p, then what could be the legal analogue to 
this? I believe the answer has to do with finding for the plaintiff. Specifically, the 
legal analogue to being justified in believing something false is finding a defendant 
liable for good reasons, though he is ultimately not at fault. This then serves as 
another reason why it should be possible to satisfy the burden of proof even if the 
judgment is false.
Thus:
DIII The theoretical framework must show that some false convictions 
ought to satisfy the burden.
(Note: To save space in Section 3, I will only discuss desiderata that the theoretical 
framework do not satisfy. Thus, if a theoretical framework appears to satisfy the
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above desideratum, I will forgo discussing how it meets that condition)
2.5 CODICILS
As my final desideratum, I propose a simplicity constraint, which is only to be
invoked if the framework meets DI - DIII. This constraint derives its plausibility
historically from work by scientists, mathematicians and philosophers who stress
that, ceteris paribus , simpler theories are better.45 Hence, simplicity is seen as a
theoretical virtue.46My condition puts a constraint on how a test may handle po-
45 Aquinas adopted simplicity as a theoretical virtue when he writes: “We may as-
sume the superiority ceteris paribus of the demonstration which derives from fewer 
postulates or hypotheses (1945, 129). Kant, following suit, argues that “rudiments or 
principles must not be unnecessarily multiplied” (1950, 538-9). This is not far re-
moved from Newton, who includes a principle of parsimony as one of his three “Rules 
of Reasoning in Philosophy” at the beginning of Book III of Principia Mathematica 
(1972, 398). Also, Lavoisier writes in support of simplicity: “If all of chemistry can 
be explained in a satisfactory manner without the help of phlogiston, that is enough 
to render it infinitely likely that the principle does not exist, that it is a hypothetical 
substance, a gratuitous supposition. It is, after all, a principle of logic not to multiply 
entities unnecessarily (1862, 623-4). Finally, Lewis writes: I subscribe to the general 
view that qualitative parsimony is good in a philosophical or empirical hypothesis 
(See: 1973, 87)
46 Not all philosophers share this view. Margaret Urban Walker (2007), for example,
argues that simplicity constraints are part of a bias that philosophers should avoid.
The bias is a part of, what she calls, the theoretical-juridical model of morality (or
TJM), according to which moral theories attempt to “represent” the ideal capacity
of the well-equipped moral agent, or try to justify its issue, in a codifiable, com-
pact, consistent procedure(s) for generating or justifying action-guiding judgments
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(Walker; 2007, 43). By “compact”, I take Walker to mean “simple” or something 
synonymous to it.
Walker’s strongest objection against TJM is perhaps the claim that TJM represents 
aspects of a social order that fosters, among other things, oppression towards women. 
I do not challenge whether Walker is right about the causal connection between TJM 
and gender inequality. For all I know, Walker’s point may very well be true. Walker’s 
worry with TJM does, however, raise an important question. By linking gender 
oppression with TJM, she also intends to undermine standard practices associated 
with TJM, including codifiability, compactness, and consistency. But why should we 
think that her criticism, if accurate, shows that we ought to reject every aspect of 
TJM, including compactness as a procedural approach? We do not say, for example, 
that P is false, or objectionable merely because of its relation with Q, which we think 
is false or objectionable. Indeed, a lot more would need to be said about why P’s 
being associated with Q gives us reason to reject P. Put somewhat differently, for 
Walker’s argument against simplicity to go through, she would need to show that 
simplicity is what makes TJM foster gender inequality (or strongly contributes to 
it). Or, she would need to raise an entirely new difficulty with simplicity that 
is separate from the problems she has with TJM.
It is unclear whether she has done either adequately. It is also worth mention-
ing that Walker does not provide much better in terms of an alternative to TJM. 
Her own positive theory - the expressive-collaborative model, which underscores (i) 
giving responsibilities to others; and (ii), methodological suggestions, including trans-
parency testing and strong objectivity - collapses the distinction between ‘morality 
as a social phenomenon’ and ‘morality as what we have reason to do’. On Walker’s
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tential objections. It is common for philosophers to invent specially made entities 
and or conditions (hereafter, codicils) designed to block potential objections to their 
theory.47Such codicils, though not necessarily a sign of error, tend to have several 
undesirable properties.
To begin, codicils often have little connection to the theories they are de- signed to 
strenghthen. This is to be expected, given that philosophers only invoke such 
entities to circumvent problems their theories may lead to. The entities would have 
no place in the theory were it not for the potential problems the entities are designed 
to block.
Also, codicils do not always reflect reality. One example of this can be seen in view, 
morality is merely a social phenomenon, which emerges out of negotiation and
takes different forms in different societies. But does not regarding morality in this
way inevitably lead to moral relativism? This spells trouble for Walker, given that
she wants to avoid endorsing relativism. In conclusion, I find neither Walker’s com-
ments against simplicity nor her positive theory as reason to reject simplicity as a
desirable property for a theory to possess.
47 The style of reasoning that I have in mind is sometimes known as ad hoc, which is 
nothing new in philosophy. There is, however, much debate about what is meant by 
ad hoc. Irving Copi propounds three different senses of ad hocness: (i) an ad hoc 
hypothesis is one which is specially made up to account for some fact after that fact 
had been established; (ii) ad hoc is also used to characterize a hypothesis which 
accounts only for the particular fact or facts it was invented to explain and has no 
other explanatory power, that is, no other testable consequences; and (iii), ad hoc can 
be used to denote a mere descriptive generalization. Such a descriptive hypothesis will 
assert only that all facts of a particular sort occur in just some particular kinds of 
circumstances, and will have no power or theoretical scope. (See; 1972, 452-453) My 
second desideratum targets the first two senses of ad hoc reasoning.
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Ptolemy’s treatment of Mars’ retrograde motion in his treatise the Almagest .48 In
the 2nd-century AD, Claudius Ptolemy formalized an earth-centered view of the
universe - a view scientists since then have rejected. Although Ptolemy’s model had
predictive power,49 it also employed epicycles - a geometric model used to explain
the variations in speed and direction of the apparent motion of the Moon, Sun, and
planets. Ptolemy’s usage of epicycles was not original. By the the end of the 3rd
century BC, the Greek astronomer Appollonius of Perga had already developed a
view of the universe using epicycles.50 But Ptolemy’s use of epicycles to account for
Mars’ retrograde motion is one of the grounds of an instrumentalist reading given to
the Ptolemaic system.51
A third concern with using codicils is pragmatic. The more such conditions are
postulated the more unwieldly the theories using them may become. The shift from
a Ptolemaic model of the universe to Copernicus’ sun-centered model in the 16th
century also exemplifies this point. Ptolemy’s system, with equants and epicycles,
was highly complicated, leading many scientists to view it as messy. Epicycles also
appear on Copernicus’ system, but required many fewer epicycles than Ptolemy.52
48 See DWitt; 2004, 117-124
49 (See Seeds; 1998, 44-49)
50There is evidence of epicycles being developed by Hipparchus of Rhodes, who also
predates Ptolemy.
51 (See MacIntyre; 2006, 10; DeWitt; 2004, 75; and Stathis; 1999, 29)
52 (See The Copernican Model: A Sun-Centered Solar System)
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The logic of Copernicus’ model made this possible. Placing the Sun at the center
with the planets orbiting it easily explains why fewer epicycles would be needed. It
also explains why many scientists regarded the Copernican model as elegant.53
Given the difficulties with codiicls, we have pro tanto reasons to prefer one theory
over its rival, if the former has fewer of these kinds of codicils. That is how I shall
understand simplicity, and is the central idea in DIV.
DIV relates to DI, DII and DIII in the following way: It must not be the case
that in order for the framework to satisfy any one of the previous desiderata that it
employs codicils whose sole purpose in the test is to satisfy either DI, DII or DIII.
Informally, codicils addressing DI, DII or DIII must have independent justification.
A codicil having an independent justification can be satisfied by the following test:
had either DI, DII or DIII not been a desideratum, then the codicil would still
reasonably be a part of the universality test in consideration.
Thus:
DIII. The test must not invoke specially made conditions designed only
to meet DI, DII or DIII. (Note: Given that the fourth desideratum puts a con-
straint on how a test may address the other desiderata, I will not discuss whether a
test satisfies DIV, if it fails to meets all of the other desiderata.)





An indication that a problem proves difficult to resolve can often be seen by the
number of proposed solutions to it. The literature on statistical evidence is extensive,
with many attempts to explain the difference between statistical and individualized
evidence. Some attempts explain the social and moral issues that would arise if
courts began to convict individuals on the basis of statistical evidence alone. Other
attempts appeal to epistemic norms as marking the difference between both types of
evidence, the idea being that individualized evidence possesses epistemic properties
but bare statistical evidence does not.54 The first collection of arguments seem to
view the problem of statistical evidence as a moral issue, and consequently provide
a moral theory of individualized evidence. The second collection of arguments, on
the other hand, seem to view the problem of statistical evidence as an epistemic
54 I do not claim that these are the only two categories into which extant theories of 
individualized evidence fall. There is work on naked statistical evidence that relies 
on probability. Contributors include Edward K. Cheng (2013), Reconceptualizing 
the Burden of Proof, 122 Yale Law Journal, and Marcello Di Bello (2019), Trial by 
Statistics: Is a High Probability of Guilt Enough to Convict? 128 Mind. There is 
also work on statistical evidence that relies on the idea of “weight”. One contributor 
is Alex Stein’s Foundations of Evidence Law, Oxford University Press, 2005. Each 
category is worthy of attention and consideration. Given space and time constraints, I 
thought it worthwhile to focus on the two often discussed categories of individuualized 
evidence.
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issue, and thus offer an epistemological framework of individualized evidence. In this
Subsection, I evaluate some of the most influential moral proposals in light of the
aforementioned desiderata. Although the authors did not design their accounts with
the above conditions in mind, it is nonetheless worthwhile to see how their accounts
fare with the conditions. The first batch of proposals call attention to the issues and
violations that statistical evidence cases cause on the defendant. As such, I will refer
to them as defendant-based concerns.55
3.1.1 Defendant-based frameworks
3.1.1.1 Defendant-Specific Claims
Mark Colyvan et al., claim that the problem with relying solely on statistical
55 Contributions in this camp include Posner, Richard (1999), who claims that a 
resort to statistical evidence reveals that no other evidence could be found, and that 
this in itself indicates the weakness of the plaintiff’s case; Wright, Richard (1988) 
who argues that eyewitness testimony is about the specific case but merely statisti-
cal evidence is not and thus is no way related to determining what happened in the 
specific case; Colyvan, Mark et al., (2001) who maintain to find for the plaintiff in 
a naked statistical evidence case is to punish the defendant for being a member of a 
reference class; Lilquist, Erik (2002) who asserts that to punish the defendant in a 
naked statistical evidence is to compromise justice in order to achieve a more ecient 
result in the overall class of cases; Nesson, Charles (1985) who states that rulings 
based on statistical evidence may be illegitimate and unacceptable, despite any po-
tential probative value of the evidence, because of their adverse effect on public trust 
in the adjudication system; and Wasserman, David T. (1991) who claims that relying 
on statistical evidence violates the relevant party’s autonomy and individuality, and 
perhaps even her free will and agency.
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evidence concerns what it does to the defendant. Spefically, the defendant is being
punished for being a member of a reference class. The authors refer to this problem
as the reference-class problem. To be sure, the problem with Blue Bus case and any
other naked statistical evidence case isn’t so much that the probability of guilt (or
liability) is not sufficiently high. Rather, the problem is that that reference-class
evidence is not specific to the individual in question.56
There are many features to like about the concerns that Colyvan et al. raise as
it relates to naked statistical evidence. Indeed, it does appear that to pro-plaintiff
findings in such cases punishes the defendant for belonging to the a particular referent
class. Further this does seem to be (at least) one of the reasons we are uncomfortable
with how such cases are handled. Notice, however, that Colyvan and his colleagues
offer no explanation as to how DNA evidence, despite also being a form of statistical
evidence, is not vulnerable to the same allegation. In fact, their diagnosis of the
problem offers little in terms of how to address the other desiderata. At best, the
reference-class problem only provides a diagnosis of the issue.
3.1.1.2 Autonomy Considerations
Another argument against naked statistical evidence cases that looks at it from
the vantage point of the defendant is offered by David Wasserman.57 Wasserman
claims that a fair trial should always respect the defendants’ autonomy, free will,
and other values. Indeed, the defendant should be tried while knowing that her
56 (See Colyvan et al., 2001)
57 (See 1991)
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individuality remains intact. However, relying solely on bare statistics suggests an
unfair prediction of the defendant. It assumes that the defendant was bound to
commit the wrongful action they are being accused of, even if they did not actually
commit it. But such a prediction does not respect the defendant’s autonomy.
I do not doubt that defendant’s free will and other core values are compromised
by relying only on statistical evidence cases. However, this concern does not begin
to address DI, DII, or DIII? How are we to understand why DNA evidence is
treated differently from other forms of statistical evidence on Wasserman’s account?
How does Wasserman’s explanation adapt to the different standards of proof in the
law? Wasserman account does not respect any of the desiderata.
3.1.1.3 About-Relation Claims
Richard Wright propounds an agument dealing with the harms of statistical ev-
idence from the defendant’s point of view. Wright distinguishes between evidence
that is genuinely about the particular defendant and evidence that is unrelated to the
defendant’s matter. On his view, naked statistics are merely accidental groupings.
As such, they do not count at all “as proof of what actually happened on a particular
occasion.”58
Wright’s concern is well noted. However, this does not explain why DNA evidence
is treated differently. In what way is DNA evidence about the defendant but other
forms of statistical evidence isn’t? Wright’s explanation is unable to capture our
intuition concerning DNA evidence. Indeed, his issue with naked statistics do not
satisfy the other desiderata either.
58(See Wright; 2001, 1056)
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3.1.2 Nondefendant-based frameworks
So far we have evaluated several defendant-based, moral frameworks. Unfortu-
nately, when they are considered in light of the desirable properties stated in Chapter
2, none of them yield good results. I now move on to a new set of frameworks. The
new theories explain the issues relying on statistical evidence has on many parties
apart from the defendant.
3.1.2.1 Social-Acceptability Claims
Charles Nesson claims that verdicts based on statistical evidence are socially un-
acceptable.59 By relying on naked statistics, the legitimacy of the court is at stake.
Specifically, the public perception of the court will be tarnished if the court were
to countenance naked statistics Statistical evidence shifts the message conveyed by
the court from one of certainty to one of risk assessment.60 In doing so, it expressly
states the risk of error underlying the judicial verdict and may thereby weaken the
stystem’s legitimacy in the eyes of the public.
Unfortunately, Nesson’s proposal suffers from the same problem as the frameworks
in the previous Subsection. Nothing in Nesson’s explanation can be used to provide
a guide for what makes DNA evidence different from other forms of naked statistics.
Additionally, Nesson’s proposal does not seem to handle the other desiderata in
chapter 2.
59 (See Nesson; 1979)
60 (See, Enoch et al., ,70)
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3.1.2.2 Exogenous-Factor Claims
A final argument in the literature is provided by Richard Posner, who claims that 
resorting to naked statistics reveals something telling. If the claimant has to appeal 
to bare statistics, then this underscores the tenuity of her case. If this is, indeed, the 
case, statistical evidence should be accorded less weight simply because it tends to 
be submitted in circumstances in which the case of the party presenting the evidence 
is weaker.
I do not doubt that defendant’s free will and other core values are compromised 
by relying only on statistical evidence cases. However, this concern does not begin 
to explain what makes DNA evidence different. Indeed, it does not satisfy the other 
two desiderata either.
So far, I have discussed several theories of naked statistical evidence focusing 
on moral issues. The strength of such theories lies in their pointing out the indi-
vidual and societal issues with relying solely on statistical evidence. Many of the 
problems discussed capture our intuitions about the wrong-making features of bare 
statistics. Despite the virtues of these proposals, it must also be noted that they 
do not meet the desiderata offered in Chapter 2. I will now consider, what I call, 
epistemological frameworks. Such theories are thus named, given that they adopt 
ideas and concepts from theories in the literature of traditional epistemology. When 
surveying the epistemological theories in the literature, a pattern emerges, not too 
different from the pattern focusing on the moral issues with naked statistics: the 
theories within this category can be sorted into one of two subcategories. Some ac-
counts appeal to knowledge, inter alia, as the defining feature that separates naked
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statistical evidence cases from nonstatistical evidence cases. Such theories will be 
called knowledge-based accounts. Other approaches appeal to some concept other 
than knowledge as the defining feature. For convenience, I will refer to this latter 
category as nonknowledge-based accounts.
3.2 EPISTEMOLOGICAL THEORIES
3.2.1 Knowledge-based theories
3.2.1.1 Causal-Connection and Guarantee Argument
One well-known theoretical framework, defended by Judith Jarvis Thomson (1986), 
holds that an appropriate causal connection between the litigated facts and the defen-
dant marks the difference between statistical evidence and individualized evidence. 
Thomson provides three paradigmatic cases, each exemplifiying different forms that 
the causal relation to the evidence can take. One pathway is, what Thomson calls, 
forward-looking evidence; another is backward-looking evidence, and a third path-






The evidence caused the crime.
Example: Not having insurance while
driving motivates the perpetrator to




The crime causes the evidence.
Example: Rapidly driving off the
scene of an accident causes the
perpetrator to leave skidmarks at the
crime scene.
common cause The evidence and crime have a
common cause.
Example: The perpetrator’s fleeing
the scene of a crime and leaving tire
skidmarks indicates a common cause:
the perpetrator was driving on a
suspended license.
Table 3.3.1
What makes having an appropriate causal connection to the evidence so valuable?
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It is that such a connection provides a guarantee that the claim (or charge) is true. 
For example, the testimony of an eyewitness can prove that a defendant shoplifted, 
since the fact that the defendant shoplifted is a cause of her testimony. By contrast, 
the fact that most teenagers shoplift during the week between the hours of 4 and 5 
pm is causally unconnected with the fact that any particular defendant shoplifted, 
and so the former fact is insuffiicient to prove the latter, even by a preponderance of 
the evidence.
Thomson’s account, however, runs afoul when dealing with DII and DIII. Be-
ginning with DII, Thomson’s notion of guarantee seems overly stringent for under-
standing standards lower than beyond reasonable doubt. As Redmayne 2008 notes, 
the civil standard of proof cannot require knowledge, since the subjective component 
of this standard is merely that the trier of fact has greater than .5 credence that 
the defendant is liable. By contrast, knowing that a defendant is liable requires the 
trier of fact to fully believe that the defendant is liable, which is a much stronger 
constraint.
Acknowledging the above problem that the causal connection as guarantee view 
faces, Thomson extends her account from criminal to civil burdens. According to 
Thomson, different standards of proof correspond to how sure fact-finderss are of 
having a guarantee of culpability. She writes,
Our law requires the jury in a criminal case to be sure beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant is guilty before imposing liability on him; the friend of individu-
alized evidence may be taken to say that the jury must be sure beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant is guilty because of being sure beyond a reasonable doubt 
that there are facts available to it which guarantee that the defendant is guilty. Our
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law requires the jury in a case in tort to believe no more that that it is more probable
than not that the defendant is guilty; the friend of individualized evidence may be
taken to say that the jury must believe it is more probable than not that the de-
fendant is guilty because of believing it more probable than not that there are facts
available to it which guarantee that the defendant is guilty.61
A charitable way to interpret Thomson’s treatment of the “clear and compelling
evidence” standard is as follows: to meet the standard, the trier of fact must believe
she has clear and compelling evidence that there are facts available to her which
guarantee the defendant is liable. To satisfy a “reasonable suspicion” standard the
trier must believe she has reasonable suspicion that there are facts available to her
which guarantee that crime is underway.
I maintain that there are still problems that Thomson’s revised version engenders.
First, what does it mean to possess clear and convincing forms of evidence that
guarantees liability? This is woefully unclear. Secondly, Thomson’s revised position
still seems overly stringent. However, we understand what it means to possess less
than certain forms of evidence that guarantees liability, it seems possible for the
fact finder to possess clear and convincing evidence that indicates liability short or
guranateeing it.
Finally, Thomson’s account does not satisfy DIII either. Her knowledge-based
account delivers factive standards of legal proof. Thus, on her view, an innocent
defendant cannot be proven guilty. But, as was argued in Section 2, this result is
unacceptable.
61(See Thomson; 1986, 215)
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3.2.1.2 Probabilistic-knowledge Argument
The next framework, defended by Sarah Moss, is specifically designed to handle
the adaptive requirement. Similar to Thomson’s causal connection, Moss’ view holds
that legal proof requires knowledge. But, unlike Thomson, the kind of knowledge that
Moss builds her legal theory on is probabilistic, not propositional.62 To understand
probabilistic knowledge, we must get clear on what it means, on Moss’ account, to
know a probabilistic content.
Moss takes probability spaces to be the content of probabilistic knowledge, where
a probabilitiy space is a tuple s = 〈Ωs,zs, µs〉, such that:
• Ωs is a set of possible worlds
• zs is a σ-algebra such that for all ω∈Ωs, {ω} ∈ zs
• µs is a probability measure on zs
Informally, a probability space is a probability distribution over a given set of possible 
worlds. To see this, suppose the gambling statuses of Sally and Amy are the only facts 
that interest us. Then there are four possible worlds: one in which both gamble, one 
in which neither gamble, and two more in which only Sally or Amy gambles. Suppose 
that I am completely sure that Sally does not gamble, but completely unsure whether 
Amy does. On Moss’ view, my epistemic state is represented by a set of probability 
spaces, with one probability space for each probability distribution over the two 
worlds at which Sally does not gamble.
62 Moss’ probabilistic knowledge is not merely propositional knowledge about prob-
abilities. She also denies that it is simply evidential or epistemic probability.
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Moss’ notion of probabilistic knowledge has several advantages. For example, we
can get probabilistic knowledge63 in all the familiar ways of getting propositional
knowledge - viz , by testimony, perception, inference, memory, and a priori reflec-
tion.64 Second, probabilistic knowledge seems compatible with a recent movement in
epistemology: knowledge first, which originates with Williamson (2000). As Patricia
Rich writes, “The starting point of knowledge-first epistemology is that knowledge is
unanalyzable, more fundamental than belief, and more important than belief.”
A third advantage to Moss’ probabilistic knowledge has direct application to DII
- viz ., it can capture what it means to satisfy the burden of proof across the various
legal proceedings. Specifically, on her account, a defendant is proved liable by prepon-
derance of the evidence only if the fact-finder has greater than 0.5 credence that the
defendant is liable, and that credence constitutes knowledge. Similarly, a defendant
63 Moss also tells us what theory is not saying. Probabilistic knowledge is not just
knowledge of objective chances - viz , the objective chance that someone is a gambler
is either 0 or 1, but my credences are intermediate. Similarly, probabilistic knowledge
is not propositional knowledge about probabilities. Also, we do not have probabilis-
tic knowledge in a trivial sense, just because we can derive probabilistic statements
from propositional ones. For example, If I can know that Sally probably gambles,
the explanation is not (necessarily) that I know that Sally gambles, so I know she
probably does. One can know that something is the case without grounding her
knowledge in the fact that it is the case. Finally, probabilistic knowledge is not a
second kind of knowledge. Moss holds that all knowledge is fundamentally proba-
bilistic and familiar propositional knowledge is just the limiting case in which the
proposition receives probability 1. The limiting case is, according to Moss, “nomi-
nally probabilistic knowledge. (See, Moss; 2017, Ch. 1.4) This is how probabilistic
knowledge can therefore be explained in just the same way that we would explain
traditional propositional knowledge.
64(See Moss; 2018, 86)
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is proved liable by clear and convincing evidence only if the judge or jury knows an 
even stronger probabilistic content, and guilty beyond a reasonable doubt only if the 
judge or jury knows a still stronger probabilistic content. This view generalizes to 
saying that a standard of proof is met when the fact-finder knows a specific content 
- namely, the set of probability spaces according to which the probability of guilt or 
liability meets or exceeds the relevant threshold for the standard.
Finally, Moss’ probabilistic knowledge account of legal proof can show why mere 
statistical evidence is usually insufficient for probabilistic knowledge. Recall Prison 
Riot , which is stated in Chapter One. According to probabilistic knowledge, the 
mere statistical evidence in this case fails to provide the fact-finder with probabilistic 
knowledge. Although it might justify a 0.96 credence in the claim that any individual 
prisoner committed the murder, the fact-finder cannot know that Smith is probably 
guilty, since the mere statistical evidence does not allow her to rule out a relevant 
alternative; namely, that Smith is the one exception within the reference class. Moss 
argues that not only does this solution show why the evidence in Prison Riot 
fails to provide probabilistic knowledge that Smith is probably guilty, but it can be 
extended to an explanation of the insufficiency of mere statistical evidence in other 
proof contexts. Although the strength of the probabilistic content will vary as the 
standard of proof varies, the basic conditions on probabilistic knowledge remain fixed. 
So even in proof contexts involving much lower probabilistic thresholds, the mere 
statistical evidence might provide justification for a certain credence but not 
knowledge of this content.
Turning now to the above desiderata, I do not think that Moss’ probabilistic 
knowledge satisfies DI or DIII. Starting with DI, if ruling out all relevant alterna-
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tives is required for knowledge, then it is unclear how probabilistic knowledge can
account for the exceptional treatment given in DNA cold-hit cases. While a very
large number of relevant alternatives is eliminated in such cases, it is also true that
not all relevant alternatives are eliminated. Thus, prima facie, Moss’ proposal does
not adequately reflect the deliberation that the fact-finder actually employs in a
sizable portion of legal cases where statistical evidence suffices for a verdict.
It is worth pointing out that textual evidence seems to suggest that Moss is
mindful that her account cannot explain the exceptional treatment of DNA evidence.
In setting out the scope of her project, she writes: “To clarify what I am aiming to
explain: our hostility to statistical evidence is not without qualification. Courts
have also been increasingly willing to issue conviction on the basis of random match
DNA evidence.”65 This then leads her to conclude that “the problem of statistical
evidence is not the problem of explaining why statistical evidence is never sufficient
for a verdict, but rather why it is insufficient in many normal cases.” A natural
reading of Moss’ words suggests that she is claiming that her account of legal proof
is aimed at showing why statistical evidence is insufficient in “many normal cases.”
This would seem to imply that DNA statistical evidence cases are, at best, abnormal .
More troubling, Moss’ words also suggest that her account is not designed to explain
why courts have been increasingly willing to issue conviction on the basis of random
match DNA evidence.
If my analysis of Moss is correct, I think that there are two problems that her
claims invite. To begin, we must ask whether it is still appropriate to suggest that
the law’s favorable treatment of DNA cold-hit cases is abnormal? While it may have
65(See, 2021, 13)
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been appropriate to suggest this in the early 80s when many courts began to accept
DNA evidence, this classification is no longer apt. As Moss, herself, notes, “Courts
have been increasingly willing to issue convictions on the basis of random match
DNA evidence.”66 The current direction the law seems to be going suggests that
what was once abnormal is now the norm.67
A second, and perhaps deeper, worry relates to DI. If a robust theory of individ-
ualizing evidence ought to explain what makes DNA evidence different from other
forms of statistical evidence, then simply suggesting the former as “abnormal” would
not constitute an explanation. Indeed, the question is just pushed back one step
further: We began asking “What makes DNA statistical evidence cases exceptional? ”
But now the question is “What makes DNA statistical evidence cases abnormal? ”
Nothing is gained by designating DNA evidence as abnormal.
Given my foregoing concerns, we might be tempted to think that a plausible re-
joinder is available to Moss. Instead of concluding that she thinks of DNA cases
as “abnormal”, she could just be setting aside cases involving DNA evidence and
asking why statistical evidence is not sufficient for conviction in normal cases. In
fact, if pressed, Moss could say that what makes DNA cases unique is that DNA ev-
idence alone generates the kind of probabilistic knowledge that satisfies the relevant
standard of proof; whereas, other naked statistical evidence alone won’t generate
probabilistic knowledge. But this line of argumentation also invites further diffi-
66 (See 2021, 14)
67 See Roth 2010 for discussion of the recent rise in “pure cold hit” prosecutions.
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culties. How is it that DNA statistical evidence cases alone generate probabilistic 
knowledge? What properties do such cases possess that other statistical evidence 
cases lack? Moss would owe us an explanation of this. Moreover, by looking at her 
explanations of why other forms of naked statistical evidence cases fail to generate 
probabilistic knowledge, I do not see how her explanation can be anything but ad 
hoc.
Probabilistic knowledge does not seem to respect DIII either. Or, it is not able to 
solve it without great difficulty. To see this, note that given the fact-finder is required 
to probabilistically know that the defendant is liable (or guilty) and since factivity68 is 
a constituent of knowledge, requiring that the fact-finder knows that the defendant is 
liable (or guilty) implies, as the objection goes, that it actually be the case that the 
defendant is liable (or guilty). However, it seems that there is at least one response 
that Moss can give to this objection. The objection seems to conflate Moss’ notion of 
probabilistic knowledge with propositional knowledge. The latter requires factivity 
but the former does not - or, at least, it does not seem to require what we traditionally 
mean by factivity. Thus, the factivity implication leveled at probabilistic knowledge is 
unwarranted.
I believe that there are at least two problems with this response. The first is 
epistemic. Given that factivity is the least controversial property of propositional 
knowledge, and hence not a property that is easily abandoned in moving to a prob-
abilistic concept, probabilistic knowledge faces a severe interpretive challenge. To
68 Factivity means that an agent can only know some φ when φ is true, or ... when 
φ. Put simply, knowledge entails truth.
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offer a notion of factivity to fit probabilistic knowledge, Moss rephrases it in terms
of probability spaces:
The set of probability spaces according to which Smith knows that Jones
probably smokes is a subset of the set of probability spaces according to
which Jones probably smokes, and that is why the former entails the latter.
The same goes for any subject S and any probabilistic content p. The
probabilistic content that S knows p is a subset of the content p itself. At
a second pass, that is what it means to say that probabilistic knowledge is
a factive attitude69
There are, however, severe challenges with this interpretation. Rich writes “On the
face of it ... a probabilistic φ cannot be non-trivially true. Jones either smokes or
she does not; there is no possible world in which she probably smokes.” Moss insists
nonetheless that probabilistic φ can be true, as required for probabilistic knowledge.
She relies on our intuition, especially about the assertability of probabilistic state-
ments. While there seems to be some linguistic data on her side, the notion of
probabilistic knowledge cannot do much work in epistemology until there is a more
concrete method of determining (and modeling) when an agent has probabilistic
knowledge of some φ, which requires determining φ.70
69 (See Moss; 2017, 126)
70 (See Rich; 2020)
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Secondly, there is textual evidence that Moss acknowledges that her view implies
factive standards of legal proof. In defending her view against possible objections,
she writes:
“The first objection, which is perhaps the prevailing objection in philo-
sophical discussions of legal proof, is that the knowledge account delivers
factive standards of legal proof. According (sic) my account, an innocent
defendant cannot be proven guilty. Some find this result unacceptable.”71
If Moss’ proposal does not imply factive legal standards of proof, then we would
expect her to correct the errant accusation. However, this is in fact what she does
not do. What we instead read is a defense of factivity in legal standards of proof. One
last piece of textual evidence that Moss’ account implies factivity can be seen in a
footnote where Moss attempts to deal with the objection. She writes: “For simplicity,
I focus on the criminal standard in this section. The civil standard of proof by a
preponderance of the evidence is also factive, in the sense that a defendant cannot
be proved probably liable unless the defendant is probably liable.”72 If factivity were
not a consequence of her proposal, it would seem odd for her to write this footnote.
I conclude then that Moss’ framework has many attractive features. For exam-
ple, the probabilistic account is able to address several legal puzzles.73 Addition-
71 (See Moss; 2018, 27-28)
72 (See Moss, 2018, 27-28)
73 For example, in liability cases, it explains why we think it is not permissible 
to
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ally, Moss’ solution to the problem of mere statistical evidence generalizes beyond 
legal philosophy. Moss handles statistical generalization in social life in a similar 
way.74However, the underlying issue with Moss’ account is her requirement that the 
fact-finder be in a position of knowing that legal burden is satisfied. Specifically, 
requiring that the fact-finder eliminate all relevant alternatives does not adequately 
reflect the fact-finder’s deliberation in determining outomes of cases. This is, in part, 
why her account cannot provide a non ad hoc explanation for why courts sometimes 
do find statistical evidence sufficient for a verdict. To overcome this problem, a ro-
bust account of individualized evidence must not only explain why courts do not
find statistical evidence sufficient for a verdict in some cases, but also why they do
in other cases.
3.2.2 non Knowledge-based theories
Knowledge-based theories possess several strengths. However, a common problem,
as it relates to the desiderata proposed in Chapter Two, is that such theories seem ill-
suited for satisfying DIII. Even with a nontraditional notion of knowledge, as is found 
find for the plaintiff in the blue-bus case. Similarly, in criminal cases, it explains 
why it is impermissible to return a guilty verdict to a random defendant in Prison 
Riot.
74 Indeed, in cases of social generalization where one’s evidence consists only of 
mere statistical evidence, we are unable to rule out the possibility that an individual 
person is unlike an arbitrary member of their reference class. Thus we will not be in 
a position to know that the individual probably has the target property.
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in Moss’ probabilistic knowledge, such views have difficulty satisfyingDIII. The next
set of theories that I will discuss in this chapter will, similar to the preceding two
theories, appeal to epistemic properties in marking the distinction between statistical
and individualized evidence. But, unlike the above theories, the epistemic property
appealed to does not entail or assume some form of knowledge.
3.2.2.1 The Reasonable and the Relevant Argument
The first theory of individualized evidence, under this category, that I will con-
sider is defended by Gardiner (2019), who appeals to a relevant alternative account
of knowledge, according to which a subject S knows that p only if she can rule
out relevant alternatives to p. By an alternative, Gardiner has in mind an error
possibilitiy that is best understood as a collection of sub-alternative possibilities.
Such possibilities are incompatible with the target belief. Gardiner writes, “If the
alternative obtains, then the belief is false.”75
Not all possibilities need to be considered, let alone ruled out. Some error possi-
bilities may rightly be ignored, because they are, for example, farfetched. Following
Lewis (1996), Gardiner defines relevant alternatives as those error possibilities that
cannot be properly ignored.76 Such alternatives, themselves, will be ones that are
important, reasonable, and relevant. Finally, to rule out an alternative is to possess
some evidence that discriminates the truth from the alternative.
This relevant alternatives framework for knowledge is then used to explain the
75 (See Gardiner, 2019, 293)
76 (See Gardiner, 2019, 295)
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error possibilities that can be disregarded in each legal standard of proof. Gardiner
maintains that the error possibilties can be classed into three concentric circles;
three tiers of disregardability. Starting with the preponderance of evidence stan-
dard of proof, this standard encloses all preponderant error possibilities. Such error
possibilities are the most important and significant and so the least disregardable.
A second tier - that is, the clear and convincing standard of proof - marks those
error possibilities that must be addressed in order to satisfy the clear and convincing
evidence standard.77 One’s body of evidence might satisfy the preponderance stan-
dard, by addressing the most preponderant error possibilities, but fail to satisfy the
more demanding standard. The final standard of proof - the proof beyond reason-
able doubt - requires addressing all reasonable error possibilities. Gardiner writes,
“This is a more expansive set than the alternatives relevant to clear and convincing
evidence.”(See Gardiner, 2019, 299).
Gardiner then sets forth a relevant alternatives condition on legal standards of
proof in terms of error possibilities that can be disregarded.
• General: Claim p is established to a legal standard L only if the evidence ad-
duced rules out the L-relevant error possibilities.
• Preponderance: Claim p is established to a preponderance of the evidence only
if the evidence adduced rules out preponderant error possibilities.
• Intermediate: Claim p is established to the “clear and convincing evidence”
standard only if the evidence adduced rules out the error possibilities relevant
to the clear and convincing evidence standard.
77(See Gardiner, 2019, 299)
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• Reasonable doubt: Claim p is established beyond reasonable doubt only if the
evidence adduced rules out the reasonable error possibilities.
Moving onto the desiderata, I believe that Gardiner’s proposal is unable to
satisfy DI, or it at best is not able to do so without great difficulty. I begin by
applying the aforementioned litmus test to Gardiner’s reasonable doubt condition.
To explain why the fact-finder is to find for the plaintiff in DNA but not in Brawl ,
Gardiner would be committed to saying that the evidence adduced in DNA (and all
DNA-like cases) rule out all reasonable error possibilities, but the evidene in Brawl
does not. But, this is not very helpful. The issue here seems to be one of vagueness.
A deeper look into both cases reveals that there are similarities that do not seem to
be explained by Gardiner’s account. In DNA and Brawl , there is a high degree
of certitude in the defendant’s guilt. Moreover, both cases have individuals who are
not ruled out. Given these facts, Gardiner would have us believe that the reason we
think the cases should be treated differently is that the evidence adduced in DNA
rules out the reasonable error possibilities, but not in Brawl . But it is difficult to
see what reasonable error possibilities could account for the different treatment in
each case. At the very least, Gardiner owes us an explanation of how her theory
would make sense of this.
3.2.2.2 Sensitivity and Incentives-Based Argument
An older but well-known theory of individualized evidence is defended by Enoch
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et al (2012) and Enoch and Fisher (2013)78, who propose, what may be called, a
hybrid approach, which possesses both epistemic and practical features. Beginning
with epistemic considerations, Enoch et al (2012) and Enoch and Fisher (2013) base
their view on a key component of Robert Nozick’s (1981) truth tracking theory of
knowledge, which asserts the following:
Sensitivity of Beliefs (SB):
S ’s belief that p is sensitive just in case if p were not true, then S would not
believe that p.
The authors develop a notion of evidence based on SB.
Sensitivity of Evidence (SE):
Evidence e is sensitive to p just in case if p had been false, then e would have
been false.79
The authors then use SE to explain the distinguishing feature between individu-
alizing and statistical evidence. The reason statistical evidence is unreliable is that
the evidence is insensitive - the evidence obtains even if the crime would not have.
Individualized evidence, on the other hand, is sensitive - if the defendant did not
78 The sensitivity solution has stimulated the debate on naked statistical evidence, 
and been investigated in terms of a Bayesian likelihood ratio by Edward Cheng (2013; 
1269-1270) and Marcello DiBello (2018;10)
79 The idea of epistemic sensitivity is developed to compare possible worlds. But it 
should be noted that the idea uses the term ’sensitivity’ in a way that differs from 
the statistical concept of sensitivity. In statistics, for example, sensitivity refers to 
the probability of the evidence given that the hypothesis is true, but Enoch et al., 
talk about ’sensitivity’ with regard to the possibility of seeing the evidence given 
that the hypothesis is false.
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commit the crime, the individualized evidence would not have obtained.
Despite the epistemic value sensitivity derives from distinguishing between indi-
vidualized and statistical evidence, Enoch et al., argue, however, that sensitivity does
not have legal value and consequently should not be of legal concern.80 To provide
a distinction that is of legal concern, the authors get inspiration from an issue that
Sanchirico (2001) has raised against character evidence.
Character evidence is used to describe a character trait of a person, such as a
tendency to tell lies.81 It is often thought of as a type of interpersonal statistical
evidence, since it does not directly link the relevant individual to the wrongful act
of which he or she is accused. In fact, as a general rule, character evidence may not
be used in the guilt phase of a trial; it is only admissible in the sentencing phase.
Sanchirico argues that the use of such evidence in the sentencing phase provides no
incentive for previously convicted persons to refrain from wrongdoing.82 Evidence
law should be, among other things, concerned with supplying good incentives for
behavior of agents outside the legal process.
Enoch et al., believe that Sanchirico’s concern has application to naked statistical
evidence cases: if bare statistics suffices for legal faultfinding, irrespective of whether
the accused actually acts unlawfully, then what reason is there for the accused to
80 (See Enoch et al. 2013: 211-215; Enoch and Fisher 2013: 577-581)
81 It could also include a witness testifying that a party in the case has a reputation
in the community of being argumentative.
82 (See: 2001, 1227 -29)
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refrain from the unlawful act? Obviously, little to none, because “whatever he de-
cides will have negligible influence on the likelihood of his being punished.”83 For
convenience, I will refer to the view adopted by Enoch et al., as incentives-based
explanation or incentives, for short.
Turning to the DI - DIII, does the incentives-based account satisfy all of them?
I believe the answer is ultimately no. Similar to the causal account, the incentives-
based account does not meet the final two desiderata . Starting with the adaptive
requirement, the incentives-based explanation seems silent with respect to the shifts
in burden of proof. Indeed, it appears more as a one-size-fits-all approach. This
belief lends itself to concluding that the incentives-based account does not respect
DII.
We may, however, think that the problem is easily remedied were Enoch et al., to
adopt a proportional incentives-based view, according to which the degree of incen-
tives that is needed to suffice for meeting the burden of proof varies in accordance
with the legal case at hand. For instance, in criminal proceedings, the degree of in-
centives necessary to find for the plaintiff would be much higher than what is needed
to find for the plaintiff in civil matters. Going this route, however, is anything but
straightforward. Indeed, the authors would need to answer several questions: How
would incentives be measured? Whose incentives matter - the accused or the general
public? What degree of incentives suffices for satisfying the burden of proof in civil
cases? There are also civil cases in which it would seem difficult to even implement
incentives as a criterion. For example, how would the incentives-based approach
83 (Enoch and Fisher 2013; 583)
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work in settling right to die hearings?
The problems the incentives-based explanation has with DII seem to extend to 
DIII. In claiming that the removal of inecient incentives from lawful conduct is the 
defining feature of individualizing evidence, Enoch et al., do not quantify how much 
disincentives for lawful conduct need to be removed to satisfy the burden of proof. 
Thus, it is at best unclear whether some false convictions satisfy the one-size-fits-all 
approach.
In sum, the incentives-based explanation cannot adequately explain individualized 
evidence. While it may satisfy DII, it fails to properly address DI or DIII.
Of special interest, however, may be whether the sensitivity account of individu-
alized evidence, also adopted by Enoch et al., fares any better. While the authors 
do not think that sensitivity is of legal concern, it still seems worthwhile to explore 
how it stands with respect to incentives. In the next Subsection, I explore whether 
Sensitivity - Enoch et al’s other proposal - fares any better than the incentives-based 
account.
Prima facie, the incentives-based explanation, similar to sensitivity, seems to 
satisfy DI - at least, Enoch et al., would have us believe that it does. To see this, 
consider how it handles DNA, which is stated in Section 2. Assuming no further 
evidence besides what is uncovered at the crime scene emerges, most people believe 
that the DNA sample found at the scene is enough to return a guilty verdict. Enoch 
et al. believe that Sensitivity can show us why that is. On the Sensitivity account, 
we would have to ask, “Were Defendant innocent, would the trier of fact still have 
convicted him? A natural way to interpret this counterfactual question is as follows: 
“Had Defendant not been guilty but the DNA evidence nonetheless matched his
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DNA, would the trier of fact still have convicted him?” The answer seems to be 
yes . However, the authors do not believe that this is the correct way to evaluate 
the question. Following Lewis’ (1986) possible worlds semantics, Enoch et al., argue 
that the possible world in which Defendant is innocent and his DNA sample does not 
match the DNA at the crime scene (or, sample-clashing world) is closer to the actual 
world than the world in which he is innocent but his DNA sample does match the 
DNA at the crime scene (or, sample-matching world). The authors, then, propose 
another way to formulate the relevant question: Had Defendant not been guilty and
the DNA evidence did not match his DNA, would the trier of fact still have convicted
him? The answer here, it seems, is no.
Problems, however, emerge for Sensitivity when we give a closer look at Lewis’
world similarity metric. Lewis maintains that worlds are similar to the actual world
the fewer miracles or violations of the actual laws of nature they possess. Further-
more, no world is closer to the actual world than the actual world itself. This last 
condition poses a problem for Sensitivity. For there are worlds in which sample-
matching obtains: cases in which the evidence collected is contaminated; cases in
which evidence is planted.84 This means that, on Lewis’ approach, there will be some
sample-matching worlds that are closer to the actual world than sample-clashing
worlds. Such sample-matching worlds are ones in which Defendant is innocent, de-
84 Take for example, the case of Adam Scott, whose DNA matched with a sperm 
sample taken from a rape victim in Manchester, which Scott lived more than 200 
miles away and had never visited. Non-DNA evidence subsequently cleared Scott. 
The mixup was due to contamination - a careless mistake in the lab where the plate 
used to analyze Scott’s DNA from a minor incident was accidentally reused in the 
rape case.
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spite his sample being found in the crime scene. This further means that the authors’ 
proposed relevant question will not work in all DNA-like cases. Thus, even if we con-
clude that Sensitivity handles DNA correctly, it seems to do so luckily. At the very 
least, Sensitivity does not offer much reason to think that it adequately handles cases 
of DNA evidence in general.
Moving on to DII, things do not get any better for Sensitivity. Indeed, it suffers 
from the same problem as that of the incentives-based explanation: neither admits 
of degrees. The criterion used to meet the burden of proof in civil proceedings is the 
same needed to meet the standards in criminal proceedings. But this standard is too 
burdensome for civil cases.
Finally, Sensitivity does not satisfy DIII.. This is because, no false conviction is 
sensitive. To see why, suppose Nevin is accused of breaking into his ex girlfriend’s 
home in order to retrieve the jewelry he left in her home. The prosecution argues that 
a neighbor who had met Nevin before saw a person with a similar build and facial 
features as Nevin break into the victim’s home on the date in question and then get 
into Nevin’s car and leave. The prosecution also produces a correspondence between 
Nevin and the victim where the former vows to take back every item he has given 
the latter. However, as it turns out, Nevin’s twin brother, Neal, actually broke into 
the apartment. But given their striking resemblance, it was easy to confuse them. 
Neal also borrowed Nevin’s car to commit the crime. We now have a case of a false 
accusation despite there being compelling, misleading, inculpating, individualized 
evidence. To determine whether the belief held by the trier of fact is sensitive she 
must ask, “Were Nevin innocent, would the trier of fact believe Nevin is innocent?
Since the defendant is actually innocent, the answer is no. Thus, if the burden of
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proof requires that the judgment is sensitive, no false conviction satisfies the burden.
However, this result is unacceptable.
3.2.2.3 Normic Support Argument
In his work on individual inquirers, Smith (2016) develops a concept of justification
featuring a notion he calls normic support . Here I provide a simplified introduction
to his theory.85
According to normic theory of justification, an agent is justified in believing p
only if p is normically supported by her evidence.”86 Smith defines normic support
as follows: “A body of evidence e is said to normically support a proposition p just
in case the circumstance in which e is true and p is false requires more explanation
than the circumstance in which e and p are both true.” 87 More precisely:
S’s belief that some proposition p given her evidence e is normically justified only
if her belief that not p given her evidence would call for some special explanation
- the need for more explanation than the circumstances in which e and p are both
true.
So, while it might be very unlikely that my reliable car does not start when I tried
to start the engine, the car failing to start does not call for some special explanation.
Consequently, my belief that the car does not start would not be normically sup-
85 For a full discussion, see Smith (2016).
86 (See 2016; 177)
87 (See 2016; 40).
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ported. On the other hand, my compact car getting low on fuel normically supports
going on a cross-country road trip, since some special explanation would be called
for, if it never got low during the entire trip.
Several clarificatory points seem necessary. First, Smith states that his normic
standard is not meant to be applied to each individual item of evidence presented
in a trial, but is to be applied to the total evidence presented.88 Second, Smith
insists that normic support is a necessary condition for acceptance of an affirmative
verdict.89 Finally, normic support should not be seen as a rival or alternative to
purely probabilistic standards of proof. Rather, normic support should be placed
alongside such standards.90
The last point has bearing on our present purpose. Indeed, Smith argues that
combining his normic standard with current purely probabilistic standards of proof in
the law will be compatible with the overall standards of proof being higher in criminal
trials. Thus, it seems that Smith’s combination is aimed at satisfying the adaptive
requirement. Unfortunately, Smith does not say much on how normic support is to
be combined with probabilistic standards of proof. The closest he comes to spelling
out the adaptive feature of his proposal is by saying that this can be achieved “by
conjoining normic support with a more demanding probabilistic standard for criminal




trials and a less demanding probabilistic standard for civil trials.”91
Despite Smith’s limited discussion of just how normic support is adaptive, it is
still worth exploring whether his proposal respects the desideratum. Relying on what
Smith does say, the plausibility of his proposal seems to rest, among other things, on
two factors. One factor is the worlds-similarity metric Smith employs to determine
what makes one world more normal than another. Smith does address this in Smith
(2016).
’Normality’, according to Smith, is tied to one’s tendency to look for further
explanations: abnormal events require an explanation; normal events carry no such
demand. For example, it is normal for someone to win the lottery. When we hear
that someone won, we do not look for a further explanation. However, matters are
different when we hear that someone told a lie. Lies tend to require an explanation
- it is a departure from normal circumstances.’ (See Smith, 2016)
Smith’s normality view seems to have several advantages. It provides a response
to the lottery puzzle. 92 It respects multi-premise closure93 along with a host of
other formal principles. However, there are several issues the normality view invites
as it relates to DII. One worry about the overarching picture is that normalcy is
tied too closely to our inclinations to look for explanations. It is not clear that our
inclinations are fit to do the job required. Even if the normic conception does well
91 (See Smith; 2018, 1211)
92 (See, Smith 2016; chapter 3).
93 (See, Smith 2016; chapter 4)
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in a select range of cases, as McKenna notes, “there will be cases where we have no 
clear guidance regarding application of the notion. Asking,
Which event is more normal?’ or ’Would we look for an explanation? will in-
evitably not always be enough to go on. Additionally, Smith provides no advice for 
navigating disagreements about what counts as normal. For example, is winning the 
lottery more normal than lying? Is it more normal for all 100 invited guests to attend 
the party than for someone to stay home? I do not share all of Smith’s intuitions about 
what is most normal in these cases, and I expect these kinds of diffiiculties will only be 
multiplied when making judgments about comparative normality, which is needed to 
provide a degreed notion of justification. Moreover, our inclinations are subject to 
biases, as Smith rightly notes. A notion of justification that tracks those inclinations 
too closely will be prone to inherit those biases.
Another factor is a specification of what it means for one probabilistic standard to 
be more demanding than another. Unfortunately, Smith does not address this here 
or elsewhere. At first blush, we might think that for one probabilistic standard to be 
more demanding than another simply means that the former has a higher threshold 
for meeting a burden than does the latter. But, even on this conception, there are 
still some details of the relationship between normic support and varying degrees 
of probabilistic standards in the law that Smith still needs to work out. Here are 
just a few questions: What does it mean for normic support to be placed alongside 
probabilistic standards? Is normic support an additional requirement for satisfying a 
legal burden of proof? Can one’s total body of evidence normically support her legal 
claim and yet not satisfy the corresponding probabilistic burden of proof? The issues 
with normic support suggest that we look elsewhere for a framework that satisfies
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our desideratum.
3.2.2.4 Reasonable Conviction Argument
Littlejohn (2017) has argued that the difference between the two types of evidence
is that a belief should be judged against the standard of acquiring knowledge, which
statistical evidence cannot meet. Fundamental to his view is a condition for what is
required to punish:
Reasonable Conviction (RC): It is not permissible to punish a defendant if it isn’t
reasonable to believe the defendant to be guilty.94
The claim made is that it is permissible to punish someone only if it is reasonable
to believe that he/she is guilty of the charge. Littlejohn writes:
My defense of Reasonable Conviction begins with a reminder that punishment is
an act that differs in an important way from acts like betting on football matches
or taking umbrellas. This is because punishment is supposed to be a way of holding
someone accountable and it involves a backwards-looking element that other actions
lack. Thus, the act in question (e.g., imposing a prison sentence) has to be guided by
certain kinds of consideration to be a punishment... If we have a system of rules that
governs decisions to punish or to refrain from punishing, it would seem that the rules
should require that the decision to impose the harms associated with punishment
be made only when the punishment can properly express blame or at least treat the
defendant as accountable for some specific deed. It would not be proper to blame




Reasonable Conviction (or, RC) explains the implications of holding someone 
criminally responsible for alleged wrongdoing. If we are willing to exact punishment 
on the defendant, then we ought to be willing to express blame to them for a specific 
deed. This seems right. Thus, RC is an appropriate expression of punishment in 
criminal proceedings. But for RC to satisfy the adaptive requirement, it must also 
be the case that RC (or something similar) is also what courts use in civil (and other 
legal) proceedings. Given that RC is primarily concerned with reasonable grounds of 
punishment in criminal proceedings, this already suggests that it may not be adaptive 
to the other standards across legal proceedings. Yet, it is still worth exploring the 
merits of this hunch.
Turning to the desiderata, I do not think that (RC) satisfies DII. While requiring 
that it is reasonable to believe that the defendant is guilty in order to convict seems 
appropriate in criminal proceedings, it does not jibe with a balance of probability 
standard ( or even a clear and convincing standard) of proof for a couple of reasons. 
One reason rests on the difference between believing that something is the case 
versus believing that the claimant has met a standard of proof . Suppose that while 
turning at an interection, I am T-boned by another driver. We both blame each 
other for being at fault. Given our impasse, we decide to resolve the matter in small 
claims court. In general, the fact-finder has one of two ways of ruling. She may 
either judge that one of us is liable and thus must pay for damages of both vehicles. 
Alternatively, she may judge that the evidence does not show who is at fault in which 
case both complainants would be responsible for repairing the damages done to their 
respective cars. Suppose I am found at fault. Surely, this does not mean that the 
fact-finder fully believes, or even thought it reasonable to believe, that I am at fault.
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Given that the fact-finder must have greater than .5 credence that I am at fault, it is 
possible that she believe that the evidence on balance suggests I am at fault and yet 
suspend belief as to whether I actually am at fault. Indeed, the law does not require 
that the fact-finder have full, robust conviction in the plaintiff’s account of events 
whenever finding the defendant liable. One reason for this is that the law imposes 
rules to encourage that the fact-finder operates in a thoroughly binary fashion - an 
event occurred or it didn’t, a defendant is guilty or he isn’t, a defending party is 
deemed civilly liable or they are not.
Another issue with RC, as it relates to our desideratum, is that it seems at odds 
with our intuitions of when it is reasonable to believe something. Most people recog-
nize that several factors are operative in assessing whether it is reasonable to believe 
that p. One example is the context - viz , what is at stake? Suppose, for example, I 
am contemplating whether to do in-person banking at my local bank on a Friday at 
11 am or the next day at 5 pm. Although I know the bank will be open on Friday 
morning, I also seem to remember it being open after 4 pm on Saturdays. Despite 
having never done in-person banking in the evening on a weekend, it might still be 
reasonable for me to believe that the bank is open after 4 on a Saturday. However, it 
may also be that being mistaken about the hours of the bank will lead to my personal 
check bouncing and ultimately being assessed fees. Given what is at stake, it may 
be unreasonable, then, for me to believe that the bank is open in the late afternoon 
on a Saturday, even in the absence of countervailing evidence.
The above example lends to the idea that reasonable belief is context sensitive -
while, in one context, it may be reasonable to believe p given a body of background 
evidence; in another context, it may be unreasonable to believe that very proposition,
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despite the same body of evidence. For RC to to satisfy the adaptiveness requirement,
it must show that it is compatible with the standards of proof in civil proceedings.
Furthermore, given that the burden of proof in civil proceedings is preponderance
of evidence, this means that RC must also show that it is always reasonable for
the fact-finder to fully believe the plaintiff’s account of events whenever the plaintiff
satisfies the burden of proof. However, it is just not true that the fact-finder always
thinks it reasonable to fully believe the plaintiff whenever the plaintiff satisfies the
burden of proof.
I conclude then that RC may be a sensible theory of punishmnent. However, it




Let us take stock. So far, I have considered several frameworks as possible can-
didates to meet the desiderata stated in Chapter Two. As was shown in Chapter 
Three, however, no framework meets each requirement. Despite their shortcomings, 
many of the frameworks offer serious attempts at specifying the central difference 
between individualized evidence and statistical evidence. As I turn to my positive 
account, I will use some of the strengths of the previous accounts discussed in the 
previous chapter as a guide for what is needed to satisfy the above desiderata.
My account, in many ways, resembles Moss’ account, which is rooted in a relevant 
alternatives account of knowledge in epistemology. Given the similarities between 
our respective accounts, it will be significant to highlight places where we differ. 
Finally, given my aim is to satisfy the desiderata stated in Chapter Two, my focus 
will be on showing how my proposal does that and less on showing that it handles 
common cases in naked statistical evidence (e.g., The Blue Bus case, The Prison 
Riot case, etc.,). I begin with a brief discussion of epistemic contextualism from 
which different versions of relevant alternatives accounts of knowledge emerge.
4.1 CONTEXTUALISM IN EPISTEMOLOGY
Epistemic contextualism is fundamentally a view about the way the word “knows” 
functions. The central idea is that the standards for applying the word “knows” vary
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from one context to another.95 Specifically, “S knows that p (at t)” can be true in
one context and false in another - for the same subject S and the same proposition
p (and the same time t). For example, in a high-standards context, “S knows that
p” may require for its truth that S have a true belief that p and also be in a very
strong epistemic position with respect to p. And yet in another context (indeed
a low-standards context), the same sentence may require for its truth, only that S
satisfy lower epistemic standards, in addition to S ’s having a true belief that p. What
this means is that for the contextualist, one knowledge attributor can truthfully say
“S knows that p”, while another knowledge attributor, in a different context where
higher standards are in place, can truthfully say “S does not know that p”, though
each attributor is talking about the same S and the same p at the same time.96
4.2 RELEVANT ALTERNATIVES
4.2.1 The Machinery of Relevant Alternatives
One family of theories of knowledge that has had a major influence on contextu-
alist approaches is the so-called “Relevant Alternatives Account” (hereafter, RAA)
95 Put somewhat differently, the truth values of knowledge-ascribing and knowledge-
denying sentences (sentences of the form “S knows that p” and “S doesn’t know that
p” and related variants of such sentences) vary in certain ways in accordance to the
context in which they are uttered. What so varies is the epistemic standards that
S must meet (or, in the case of a denial of knowledge, come up shy of meeting) in
order for that statement to be true.
96 (See, Greco and E Sosa, 1999)
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first proposed by Fred Dretske97 in the early 1970s and further developed by Gail
Stine,98 and others.99
The basic idea behind RAA is that knowing some proposition requires that all
relevant alternatives to the proposition be ruled out.100 Given the role that RAA
serves in my project, it is useful to give a more elaborate sketch of some of the key
features of the theory. The next paragraph offers a worked-out example of RAA,
followed by a discussion of the machinery behind the account.
Suppose S decides to dine at one of her favorite restaurants. Although the food is
exquisite, what really brings her back is the service of Pierre, one highly sought after
waiter. In S ’s last visit at the resturant, Pierre provided great recommendations on
dishes that she should try for dinner and dessert. Most of all, upon hearing that
she was celebrating a birthday, Pierre displayed his mellifluous voice by singing a
happy birthday song for her. Although Pierre does not wait on her on the day that
she returns to the restaurant, she does believe that she sees a waiter standing near
the private room who looks very much like him. The waiter has the same build as
Pierre, showed the same attentiveness for his customers as Pierre did for her. He
97 (See; 1970, 1981)
98 (See; 1976)
99 (See Lewis, D. 1996; DeRose, K. 1995)
100 On this view, it is not necessary, in order to know p, that one be able to exclude
all the alternatives to p; instead, what is required is merely the ability to eliminate
certain relevant alternatives.
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even sang happy birthday to his guests just as Pierre did for her. Suppose, then,
that, based on S ’s evidence, she concludes that “Pierre is the gentleman waiting on
guests in the private room.” Call this, p. Despite S believing p, according to RAA,
there are some alternatives to p that she must rule out in order for her belief to count
as knowledge. Although the alternatives to p abound, for our purposes, it is only
necessary to consider the following minimal set of alternatives to p: S sees another
waiter who resembles Pierre but is not related to him (hereafter, r1); Arthur, Pierre’s
twin brother, is the waiter whom S sees in the private room (hereafter, r2); Suppose
the restuarant management decides to deceive S by hiring several waiters who dress,
speak, and behave just like Pierre. They also take singing lessons to sound just like
Pierre. Thus, the waiter whom S sees in the private room is a cleverly disguised
Pierre lookalike (hereafter, r3). I will call the set of alternatives to p as R. Moreover,
let us call this example WAITER, short for good waiter experience example.
We might represent WAITER in terms of a model employing the following vari-
ables:
s= the subject to whom knowledge may (or may not) be attributed;
p= the proposition that is believed;
R = the set of alternatives to p; and
e = the subject’s ability to eliminate alternatives to p
A pictorial representation of WAITER is shown in figure 4.1:
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To understand the above figure, let each cell on this 5x5 matrix represent a possible 
world. This means there are twenty five ways in which the world could be. Picture 
the worlds in which p is true (i.e., p-worlds) as the set of cells containing p, and 
the alternatives to p as the surrounding cells that do not contain p.101 The dotted 
cells represent the set of non-p worlds that s eliminates. Finally, the circle, which 
is superimposed on the figure, represents the worlds that are in play based on the 
context.102 Thus, in Figure 4.1, the worlds being considered are the ones within the 
circle, which are generated by context I. We’ll let the context determine not only 
the size of the circle, and consequently how many worlds that are being considered, 
but also the non-p worlds that must be ruled out in order for the agent to possess 
knowledge. Thus, suppose context I is low-stakes, and selects only the cell in the 
center of the matrix (i.e., the cell that is in column 3, row 3) as relevant and thus 
necessary for elimination. Then, s’s belief that p counts as ’knowledge’ in that 
context, given that the only relevant cell is eliminated. Of course, other criteria 
can be used for what constitutes a relevant alternative. If a second context (that 
is, a higher-stakes context) selects all but one non-p worlds, and context III (an 
extremely high-stakes context) selects all non-p world, as is shown in Figures 4.2 
and 4.3 respectively, then s ’s belief that p does not count as ’knowledge’ in either of 
those contexts.
101That is, suppose all the non-pworlds are the set of worlds contained in R.
102 Judgments of the quantity of worlds that fall within the circle and the size of the
circle are ultimately determined by the author, and are ultimately exogenous to the 
set up.
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Schaffer’s sketch of RAA is useful in illustrating the common features of this theory
of knowledge. Despite its virtues, there are still some questions we might have about
RAA. Perhaps, the most commonly asked question can be put as follows: What
makes one alternative, and not another, relevant? Understandably, philosophers have
provided different answers to this question. Some hold, (a) the relevance depends
on facts about what the knower believes or has evidence for believing.103 Others
argue that (b) relevance is affected by facts about the knower’s environment , even
if the knower is unaware of those facts. Still others believe that (c) whether some
alternative counts as relevant doesn’t depend so much on facts about the knower ;
rather, it depends on facts about the conversational setting in which knowledge is
being ascribed. While I do not wish to settle the issue here, I maintain that something
similar to (c) is what is needed for my overall aim. One attempt to lay out a set of
rules for (c) is found in Lewis (1996), which I develop in the next Subsection.
4.2.2: Lewis on Relevant Alternatives
David Lewis’ own version of RAA is set forth as follows:
103 (See Austin)
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Context II Context III
S knows that p iff S ’s evidence eliminates every possibility in which not p - Psst! -
except for those possibilities that we [ascribers possibly distinct from S ] are properly
ignoring.104
This means that a subject has propositional knowledge that p only if p is true
in every relevant uneliminated possibility. For Lewis, whether or not a possibility
is relevant is determined contextually, and he puts forth seven rules of relevance
which clarify how context determines relevance. The rules are divided into two sets.
The first three principles are commonly called prohibitive rules, which determine
the range of possibilities that may not properly be ignored. The remaining four are
permissive principles, which determine the range of possibilities that may be properly
ignored. Although the rules are fairly straightforward, it is worthwhile to show each
rule along with a brief description of it.
RULE OF ACTUALITY: The possibility that actually obtains may not properly
be ignored. • ”[I]t is
the subject’s actuality, not the ascriber’s, that never can be properly ignored.”
• ”[The subject’s actuality is, for example, the possibility of being the subject on
such-and-such a day at such-and-such a possible world.
RULE OF BELIEF:: A possibility may not be properly ignored if the subject
gives it, or ought to give it, a degree of belief that is sufficiently high.
• But how high is high enough? Suppose that we are in in criminal court, where
there is more at stake than there is in civil court. We want to know whether Darren
committed the crime. If we give some alternative to that claim - say, that Kofi
104 (Lewis; 1996, 425)
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committed the - even a slight degree of belief, that alternative can become relevant 
(and we’ll need to eliminate it in order to know that Darren committed the crime).
RULE OF RESEMBLANCE: We may not ignore a possibility that saliently re-
sembles a relevant possibility. • This 
rule is supposed to be the rule that allows Lewis’s theory to account for lottery 
paradoxes105 and Gettier cases.106
RULE OF RELIABILITY: We may ignore a possibility in which a reliable process 
(such as perception, memory, or testimony) fails.
RULE OF METHOD: We are entitled properly to ignore possible failures in sam-
pling (induction) and in inferences from the best explanation (abduction)
RULE OF CONSERVATISM: Generally ignored possibilities may properly be 
ignored.
RULE OF ATTENTION: A possibility not ignored at all is ipso facto not properly 
ignored.
The above rules are regarded as rules of thumb107 that often determine whether 
a possibility is relevant in a given case.108
105 For a discussion of the lotter paradox, see Wheeler (2007)
106 For a discussion of Gettier counterexamples, see Gettier (1963)
107 (See Schaffer; 2001, 203)
108 For Lewis, a possibility w is eliminated for S just in case S’s perceptual and 
memory in w would not exactly match his perceptual experience and memory in 
actuality. For Lewis, perceptual experience and memory are forms of basic evidence. 
Lewis’ general idea is that eliminated possibilities are those in which the subject’s 
basic evidence would differ. So, on Lewis’ account, S knows that p iff the rules of
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CHAPTER 5
From Epistemology to the Law
Using the combination of Schaffer’s diagram of RAA and Lewis’ set of rules of rel-
evance (hereafter, the Schaffer-Lewis model), we have a more plausible model for
a theory that can satisfy the desiderata stated in Chapter 2. Several features of
the joint account, in particular, are instructional for our purpose. To begin, on the
Schaffer-Lewis model, knowledge may properly be attributed to a subject just in case
she can eliminate every relevant possibility of error.
5.1 Developing LRA
Ruling out possible alternatives to a proposition also figures prominently in legal 
decisions. The legal fact-finder, for example, must verify a set of propositions made 
by each party by relying on such tools as oral testimony, documents and physicial 
evidence.109 This evidence, in conjunction with generalizations derived from personal 
experience and social convention, help the fact-finder make factual inferences in order 
to evaluate relevant alternatives to the claimant’s narrative of the events that need 
to be explained.
While the trier of fact is concerned with whether each party speaks truthfully, this 
relevance do not select any possibility in which p is false but S’s basic evidence stays 
the same.
109(See Pattenden; 2009, 3)
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is not the former’s primary (or, even main) task. Indeed, in order to reach a finding, 
the fact-finder must also be concerned with the cogency of each party’s narrative, 
which is often evaluated in terms of explaining key events (e.g., whether the defen-
dant did cause the accident). To be sure, the fact-finder makes several interrelated 
evaluations, including evaluating the possibility of errors that each party’s narra-
tive does or does not eliminate; and, evaluating the explananda that each party’s 
narrative has or has not explained.
Obviously, not every error a given party commits (or event they leave unexplained) 
is weighed equally. Although errors generally should be avoided, some may prove 
innocuous, and, understandably, are dismissed. Similarly, some unexplained events 
may seem inconsequential to any of the party’s case; while others could prove devas-
tating. How ought the fact-finder to determine how to assess each error or explanan-
dum? The Schaffer-Lewis model also sheds light on how this might be answered 
within a legal framework. In attributing knowledge to a speaker, Lewis invokes a 
general set of rules of relevance that may not properly be ignored by the agent to 
whom knowledge is being attributed. But not each rule of relevance needs to be 
considered in a given case. Rather, what governs whether the rule is invoked is, inter 
alia, the context in which the speech act is made.
5.1.1: The Machinery of LRA
5.1.1.1: Thesis I
The law seems to function similarly in dealing with the possibility of erroneous claims
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or unexplained events. In a given legal proceeding, rules abound for the trier of
fact to take into consideration. But, as is true for Lewis’ requirement for knowledge
attributions, some rules need not be entertained. What determines whether one rule,
but not another, is relevant will again be the context, viz - the legal proceeding.
The Schaffer-Lewis model has laid the groundwork for, what I shall call, the
Legally Relevant Alternatives view (or, LRA), which comprises three central claims.
The first thesis, hereafter, I, states that the varying burderns of proof across legal
proceedings can be captured, with a few modifications, by the relevant alterntatives
account of what shifts for knowledge attributions.
To illustrate, suppose that Julian is arrested after officers from the Sherrif’s De-
partment responded after receiving an emergency call that a man has been injured.
Eyewitnesses later tell police that a man had brutally attacked another man sitting
in a compact car. Upon arriving at the scene, the officers see Julian driving away and
the officers pursue him to an apartment, which the latter uses as residence. Inside the
apartment, the officers find a burner phone that contains a caustic text correspon-
dence between Julian and the man in the car. Moreover, during interrogation, Julian
admits that the man in the car owes him some money, but denies assaulting him. At
Julian’s arraignment, he pleads not guilty and thus goes to trial. For convenience, I
will call this example ATTACK, short for brutal attack example.
We might represent ATTACK in terms of a model employing the following vari-
ables:
t = trier of fact;110
110 The knowledge analogue to this is the subject (or, s)
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f = a finding for the claimaint (in this case, the state);111
RL = the set of legally relevant alternatives to the claimant’s account of
events112; and
e= t’s ability to eliminate alternatives to the claimant’s account of events113
A pictorial representation of ATTACK is shown in figure 5.1:
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Figure 5.1
As will become apparent, the machinery of RAA easily translates to the machinery 
I use to undergird LRA. For example, the f worlds are the set of boxes containing 
f , and the alternatives to f as the surrounding boxes that do not contain f .114 Also, 
as was the case for the machinery of RAA, the context - viz ., the legal proceeding of 
the case - determines what suces for the relevant alternatives. Finally, the dotted 
111 The knowledge analogue to this p.
112 The knowledge analogue to this is R
113 The knowledge analogue to this is e.
114That is, suppose all the non-p worlds are the set of worlds contained in R.
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Relevant Context
boxes represent the set of non-f worlds that t eliminates. For RAA, the elimination
of all relevant alternatives to p is required for knowing that p. However, for a
fact-finder to meet the burden of proof for the relevant proceeding, I do not require
the elimination of all relevant alternatives. Instead, it will suffice if the fact-finder
eliminates a sufficiently high number of relevant alternatives.
5.1.1.2: Thesis II
One lingering question some will have about my account might be put this way:
What makes the burdern of proof in one legal proceeding more (or less) stringent
than that of another proceeding? LRA has a ready-made answer, which is summed
up in thesis II: Similar to the role that Lewis’ rules serve in considering the range
of possibilities to determine whether an agent possesses knowledge, the law also
imposes rules that the fact-finder must use to consider the range of possibilities
when deliberating whether to find for the plaintiff. Of course, the quantity of rules
is case relative: some cases generate more prohibitive rules than others.
I also claim that the varying burdens of proof are, in part, determined by the
number of rules - primarily, rules of relevance - that are triggered in the legal pro-
ceeding that the case is in. Below is a minimal set of prohibitive rules (hereafter,
rules) available to the fact-finder in a given legal proceeding. My goal, here, is not
to explain each rule; rather, it is to present a typical list of rules available to the
fact-finder and show how some rules are pertinent in some cases but not in others:
(Facts) Facts of the case may not properly be ignored.
(Legal statutes) Laws pertaining to the case may not properly be ignored.
83
(Evidence) Direct or indirect evidence may not properly be ignored.
(Credibility) Credibility of witnesses may not properly be ignored.
(Inferences) Reasonable conclusions from direct and indirect evidence may not
properly be ignored.
(Arguments) Arguments of counsel may not properly be ignored may not properly
be ignored
(Special instructions) Instructions of the court may not properly be ignored.
(Impeachment) Evidence of other acts, including prior felonies, by defendant may
not properly be ignored
(Silence) Defendant’s silence in the face of accusation may not properly be ignored.
Notice that the above rules do not apply in every legal proceeding. For example,
while rules 1 - 9, may seem applicable in a homicide case, only 1 - 7 seem to apply 
in a dispute with your landlord over a security deposit. Similarly, rules 1 - 8 may be 
applicable in a standard burglary case, but not in a standard tort case. Ultimately, 
each legal proceeding has its own set of rules that the trier of fact must consider in 
reaching a decision, and while there is overlap among the proceedings, they usually 
do not share the same set of rules.
5.1.1.3: Thesis III
Finally, thesis III of LRA holds that the law prefers types of evidence that tend 
to yield high degrees of certitude. Indeed, one requirement of admissible evidence 
is that it tends to prove the matter in dispute. This is why such evidence as video 
footage, audio recordings, the murder weapon, etc., are admitted in court. When 
used to support a claim, they tend to raise the probability of that claim being true.
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The third thesis is merely an extension of the requirement that admissible evidence
be reliable. If the law requires that admitted evidence has the property of raising the
probability of a claim under dispute being true, then the more of the property that
form of evidence possesses the more the law tends to endorse that form of evidence
(or, even the evidence-producing method).
5.2 Understanding the Sufficiency Condition
Above, I state an important difference between LRA and the version of RAA on 
which my proposal is based. Specifically, RAA requires the elimination of all relevant 
alternatives in order to satisfy some requirement; my proposal, however, denies that 
the elimination of all relevant alternatives is needed to satisfy some requirement. It 
turns out that Moss’ probabilstic knowledge account has a similar requirement as 
that of RAA - she requires that the trier of fact eliminates all relevant alternatives 
in order to be in a position of knowing that the standard of proof has been satisfied 
for a given proceeding. This marks an important difference between LRA and Moss’ 
probabilistic account. I think it is too onerous to ask the trier of fact to eliminate 
all relevant alternatives to the plaintiff’s narrative in order to find for the plaintiff. 
Indeed, such a requirement would yield an undesirably low number of findings for the 
plaintiff. This is one of the grounds for my position that a finding for the claimant 
requires that only a suciently high number of relevant alternatives to the claimant’s 
narrative be eliminated.
Despite the advantages to my departure from Moss’ view, there are still questions 
that LRA generates. One question concerns the requirement for a suciently high 
number of relevant alternatives to be eliminated. We can put the question this
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way: How does one know when a suciently high number of alternatives have been 
eliminated? For conveneince, I will refer to this question as the suciency question, 
or the suciency condition. The rest of the chapter explains how the suciency 
condition can be met on LRA.
5.2.1 Resilience
5.2.1.1 Belief Perseverance
To answer the question of when enough alternatives have been eliminated, I turn to a 
curious phenomenon people exhibit when confronted with evidence that challenges an 
occurrent belief: belief perseverance. Belief perseverance (or belief resilience) is the 
tendency to hold onto a belief even after receiving new information that disconfirms or 
gainsays the grounds of that belief. There are several explanations for our tendency 
to hold onto false or discredited beliefs. In a survey article, Lee Ross and Craig 
Anderson (1982) present an experiment designed to explore “the phenomenon of 
belief perseverance in the face of evidential discrediting:
[s]ubjects first received continuous false feedback as they performed a novel dis-
crimination task (i.e., distinguishing authentic suicide notes from fictitious ones) ...
[Each subject then] received a standard debriefing session in which he learned that his 
putative outcome had been predetermined and that his feedback had been totally 
unrelated to actual performance. Before dependent variable measures were intro-
duced, in fact, every subject was led to explicitly acknowledge his understanding of 
the nature and purpose of the experimental deception.
Following this total discrediting of the original information, the subjects com-
pleted a dependent variable questionnaire dealing with [their] performance and abil-
ities. The evidence for postdebriefing impression perseverance was unmistakable ...
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On virtually every measure ... the totally discredited initial outcome manipulation
produced significant “residual” effects.
A recent series of experiments ... first manipulated and then attempted to under-
mine subjects’ theories about the functional relationship between two measured vari-
ables: the adequacy of firefighters’ professional performances and their prior scores
on a paper and pencil test of risk preference ... [S]uch theories survived the revela-
tions that the cases in question had been totally fictitious and the different subjects
had, in fact, received opposite pairings of riskiness scores and job outcomes115
On the experiments, Ross and Anderson conclude that from these and other
experiments that it is clear that beliefs can survive potent logical or empirical chal-
lenges. They can survive and even be bolstered by evidence that most uncommitted
observers would agree logically demands some weakening of such beliefs. They can
even survive the complete destruction of their original evidential basis.116
Commenting on the same experiments, Gilbert Harman (1986) adds:
In fact, what the debriefing studies show is that people simply do not keep
track of the justificatiton relations among their beliefs. They continue
to believe things after the evidene for them has been discredited because
they do not realize what they are doing. They do not understand that the
discredited evidence was the sole reason why they believe as they do. They
115 (See pp. 147 - 9)
116 Ibid
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do not see they would not have been justified in forming tthose beliefs in
tthe absence of the new discredited evidence. They do not realize these
beliefs have been undermined. it is this, rather than the difficulty of giving
up bad habits, that is responsible for belief perseverance.
Ross and Anderson, and (especially) Harman, point out some negative aspects of 
belief perseverance. It can be irrational to hold onto discredited beliefs, especially if 
the only ground for accepting the belief is what has been undermined. Moreover, a 
person who forms a habit of knowingly holding onto beliefs in the midst of conflicting 
or insucient evidence may gain the reputation of being unreliable.
But the critical comments stated above are not all that could be said about belief 
perseverance. There are some positive aspects, too. For example, when we at times 
are willing to keep a discredited belief, our willingness to do so may speak to the 
quality and quantity of the evidence we have for the belief. Indeed, it could be that 
the evidential support for believing that p is so strong that evidence that appears to 
conflict with the support for p does not impact our believing p.
Belief reslience is deeply connected to satisfying the suciency condition. Specif-
ically, meeting the suciency condition depends on the likelihood that the judge 
or jury would be willing to change their finding if provided additional, particularly, 
conflicting, evidence. But there are still questions that remain. Arguably, the put 
as follows: What distinguishes the plausible cases of resiliency with the implausible 
ones? This question should not be ignored. Indeed, it would be epistemically irre-
sponsible to retain a belief in the midst of contrary information. I maintain that 
what marks the difference between plausible cases of resiliency and implausible ones
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is weighty evidence, which is a matter of how substantial the evidence is.117 As the 
agent acquires more evidence which bears on the claim, the weight of her evidence 
increases, which in turn may make a difference to what it is reasonable to believe on 
its basis. There is an intellectual history of evidentiary weight dating back to Charles 
Sanders Peirce. To appreciate how resilience can be bolstered by evidentiary weight, 
it will be worthwhile to consider some proposals of evidentiary weight. I will follow 
my survey on weight of evidence by considering a couple of proposals on resilience, 
which incorporate evidentiary weight.
5.2.1.2 A Survey of Evidentiary Weight
5.2.1.2.1 Peirce’s view
Although it is debated, several scholars118 find in Peirce’s 1878 essay, “The Probability
of Induction” the first clear formulation of the notion of weight of evidence.119 In
the essay, Peirce contrasts a materialistic view of probability, according to which
probability statements report facts about the frequency with which one kind even 
accompanies another kind, with De Morgan’s conceptualist view, which holds that
117(See Kelly; 2008, 2)
118 (See Carnap, 1962, 554; Popper, 1959, 406; Good, 1985, Ullian, 1995, 96-97; and 
O’Donnell, 1989, 76)
119 The informal concept of weight has a long history. I. J. Good notes that, as a 
metaphor, it can be traced back at least to the Ancient Greek goddess Themis and 
her ’scales of justice’, in which the scales involvee both a balancee and a quantity of 
evideen
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probability statements concern one’s subject degree of belief that ought to attach
to a proposition. Although Peirce goes with a materialistic conception, he offers
arguments on behalf of conceptualism. The heart of Peirce’s defense is as follows:
Belief is certainly something more than a mere feeling; yet there is a feeling
of believing, and this feeling does and ought to vary with the chance of the
thing believed, as deduced from all the arguments. Any quantity which
varies with the chance might, therefore...serve as a thermometer for the
proper intensity of belief. Among all such quantities there is one which is
peculiarly appropriate....As the chance diminishes the feeling of believing
should diminish, until an even chance is reached, where it should com-
pletely vanish and not incline either toward or away from the proposition.
When the chance becomes less, then a contrary belief should spring up and
should increase in intensity as the chance diminishes, and as the chance
almost vanishes (which it can never quite do) the contrary belief should
tend toward an infinite intensity. Now, there is one quantity, which, more
simply than any other, fulfills these conditions; it is the logarithm of the
chance.120
Here Peirce calls the conceptualist’s notion of the degree of belief as a measure
of the proper intensity of the feeling of belief.121 By treating the chance as the 
120 (See W3 293 - 294)
121 To be sure, Peirce maintains that believing involves more than feelings. He claims 
that belief has three properties - it is something of which we are aware; it appeases
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external fact which generates the belief, Peirce leaves the logarithm of the chance 
as the appropriate measure of belief intensity. Peirce argues then that “belief ought 
to be proportional to the weight of evidence, in this sense, that two arguments 
which are entirely independent, in this sense, that two arguments which are entirely 
independent, neigher weakening nore strengthening each other, ought, when they 
concur, to produce a belief equal to the sum of the intensities of belief which either 
would produce separately”122
It is in developing this last reason for linking degree of belief and the logarithm 
of the chance that Peirce introduces the term “weight of evidence.” It appears that 
Peirce treats the metaphors of weighing and of balancing evidence as interchange-
able.123 In fact, given that Peirce confines his discussion to cases in which the argu-
ments in question are independent of one another, his characaterization of weight of 
evidence draws parallels to what Isaac Levi calls the net weight of evidence: “Take 
the sum of all feelings of belief which would be produced separately by all the argu-
ments pro, subtract from that the similar sum for arguments con, and the remainder 
is the feeling of belief which we ought to have on the whole.”124 The logarithm of the 
chance is taken to represent the facts which “produce” the belief, and then the feeling 
of belief ought to remain proportional to this magnitude. Kasser writes: “Just as our 
the irritation of doubt, and it governs action by establishing habits. (See W3 247 
and 263)
122 (See W3 294)
123 (See, Kasser; 2015, 638)
124(See W3, 294)
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gustatory system, if functioning properly, ought to issue in results that remain pro-
portional to the log of the stimulus that produced the taste, our cognitive apparatus
ought to respond to the log of the evidential stimulus.125
Despite offering some novel arguments on behalf of conceptualism, Peirce ulti-
mately rejects the view in favor of another position. Peirce’s objections with con-
ceptualism are two-fold: he raises an issue with the intelligibility of an appeal to a
principle of indifference. Secondly, he denies the legitimacy of personal probabili-
ties not appropriately grounded in facts. Regarding Peirce’s second formulation of
weight of evidence, some read it as an anticipation of Keynes’ conception of weight
of argument, which is what I turn to next.
5.2.1.2.2 Keynes’ view
In A Treatise on Probability , Keynes provides the following insight:
As the relevant evidence at our disposal increases, the magnitude of the
probability of the argument may either decrease or increase, according as
the new knowledge strengthens the unfavourable or the favourable evi-
dence; but something seems to have increased in either case,—we have a
more substantial basis upon which to rest our conclusion. I express this
by saying that an accession of new evidence increases the weight of an
125 Incidentally, Turing seems independently to have come up with a measure of
evidential weight that deploys odds, logarithms, and the analogy with the decibel
system almost exactly as Peirce did.
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argument. New evidence will sometimes decrease the probability of an
argument, but it will always increase its “weight”.
Unlike Peirce, Keynes seems to have gross of evidence, not weight of evidence, in 
mind. To see this, suppose someone (first inquirer) who has drawn a small number 
of beans, the vast majority of which are black, has good evidence, good reasons for 
belief, in one clear sense. We might even suggest that such evidence as she has 
bears decisively on what she is to expect. The net weight of her evidence might 
not be large, but it points in one direction; namely, in this case it clearly favors 
the hypothesis that the bag contains many black beans. Someone (second inquirer) 
who has drawn a much larger number of beans from the bag (with replacement and 
stirring) but has drawn an approximately equal number of black and white beans 
is in a less favorable situation for having an expectation about what color the next 
bean will be. But her judgment is in some clear sense more settled or more stable 
than the belief of the other inquirer.126
Several points about gross (or Keynesian) weight can be gleaned from this exam-
ple. First, Keynesian weight lacks directionality or valence; the weight of evidence 
for H will always be the same as the weight of evidence for ¬H. This also means 
that an integral feature of Keynesian weight is that it always increases when new 
relevant evidence is learned. Our second inquirer’s evidence is weighty in Keynes’ 
126 Brian Skyrms holds that increasing the number of trials increases the 
“resilience” or resistance to change of the probability judgment and Joyce 
characterizes Keynesian weight in terms of the concentration and stability of 
credences in the face of changing information.
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sense.127 Keynes is a relationist about probability and so denies that probability 
judgments based on more evidence are more likely to be true than those grounded 
on less evidential weight. Finally, probability judgments for Keynes are about the 
relationship between the evidence and the conclusion, and are, when true, logically 
true.
5.2.1.2.3 Cohen’s view
Accounts of evidential weight have also been developed with the aim of interpreting 
the legal standards of proof. Laurence Jonathan Cohen, for example, has provided 
a system of probabilities he calls Baconian so as to acknowledge their linkage to 
Bacon’s central work about the elimination of hypotheses on the basis of experimen-
tal tests. The title of Cohen’s major work on Baconian probability is The Probable 
and the Provable (1977). In this work, Cohen interprets probability to be a means 
for grading the provability of hypotheses (or generalizations) people assert about 
matters of interest.128 Cohen adopts a pluralistic view of probabilistic reasoning -
different situations require different intterpretations.129 In some situations an in-
terpretattion of a Pascalian probability130 may be acceptable. In other situations, 
127 Such evidence would (on its own) produce no strong feeling of belief according 
to Peirce’s method of balancing reasons.
128 (See 1977, 13-32)
129 (See 1977, 5-32; 1989a 81-115)
130 The probability theory associated with Pascal is better known as enumerative 
induction.
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grading the provability of some hypotheses may require probabilities having very
different properties. Specifically, Cohen addresses situations in which the provability
of some hypothesis can increase only to the extent that the agent is able to eliminate
possible reasons for its invalidity.
To understand Cohen’s proposal, consider the following example adapted from
(Schum, 1977): Suppose I assert the hypothesis: if a thing is a φ, then it is also
a ϕ. A common strategy to support this claim is to show instances of the joint
occurrence of φ and ϕ- viz ., enumerative induction. Following Cohen, eliminative
induction requires properly ruling out instances of φ’s that are not also ϕ’s. Finally,
Cohen claims that in eliminative induction the best we can do is to say that the test
provides only an ordinal measure for grading evidential support. Specifically, we can
only say that one hypothesis is better supported than another but not by how much
or by what ratio.
5.2.1.3 A Survey of Resilience
5.2.1.3.1 Skyrms on Resilience
Not only is there an intellectual history on evidential weight, but there is also one 
on resilience. To appreciate the connection between both evidential weight and re-
silience, it is also worthwhile to consider some views on resilience. Our first discussion 
is found in Brian Skyrms’ book Causal Necessity , which attempts to deal with many 
of the major problems facing philosophers today. The central idea of Causal Ne-
cessity is that invariance is the key to understanding many of these problems. The
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notion of invariance is applied to problems such as randomness, epistemic probabil-
ities, conditionals, confirmation, decision theory, just to name a few. I will focus,
however, on Skyrms’ discussion on stattistical laws, which will lead to a discussion
on resilience.
The first part of Skyrms’ book deals with propensities and statistical laws. Skyrms
believes that propensities are the probabilities that play a role in statistical laws,
and his discussion of statistical laws depends on that claim. Statistical laws tell
us that certain systems have a stable probability, which Skyrms calls propensities.
Skyrrns also explains what it means for a probability to be stable, and he defines a
notion of resiliency which is supposed to capture the idea of invariance and stability.
Resiliency is defined as:
Resiliency of Pr(q)s being α= 1 - Maxi| α— Prj(q)| over p1. . . pn (where
the Prjs are gotten by conditionalizing on some truth-functional compound
of the pis which is logically consistent with both q and its negation)131
In tthis definition the pis are properties or experimental factors which are considered
relevant to the occurrence of q . Resiliency measure the independence of q and
these factors. Consequently, resiliency is a measure of stability, independence, and
invariance. If the resiliency of a certain proposition is 1, then we know that the
proposition is necessary or invariant. Degrees of resiliency less than one correspond
to cases of approximate independence or approximate invariance. Thus we can look
at the resiliency of a proposition to determine how close we are to the ideal.
131(See Skyrms, 1982, 11-12)
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5.2.1.3.2 Lawlor on Resilience
I now turn to a recent view defended by Krista Lawlor, which incorporates elements
of weightiness and resilience. Lawlor begins by distinguishing between two concepts:
opinion and conviction. Opinions (or, credences) are the degree of belief that a
person may have in a proposition. Relatedly, convictions are a type of strong opinion
with a key property - viz , they necessitate the anticipation of constancy of the truth
of one’s opinion.132 That is, to have a conviction about p means that one anticipates
holding p even under new information. Suppose Suzy, for example, purchases a
lottery ticket where her chances of winning are one in a billion. She may have the
strong opinion that her ticket is a losing ticket, while still being open to changing her
opinion upon new information. If, however, she reads the newspaper and learns that
she did not win, she may conclude that the matter is settled, though her opinion only
slightly increases. Although Suzy has a strong opinion about her ticket losing before
reading that it does, Suzy’s opinion is not a conviction, given that she anticipate her
belief changing upon new information. It is only when she concludes that the matter
is settled that her opinion elevates to a conviction. Anticipatation of constancy of
truth, then, is what distinguishes opinion from conviction.133
Of course, mere convictions don’t imply that the agent is always being rational.
132 (See Lawlor; 2013, 6)
133 Given that convictions require the anticipation of constancy of the truth of one’s 
opinion, we might think that convictions are second-order attitudes. Lawlor, how-
ever, argues that anticipating constancy is a first-order attitude, showing itself in a 
range of behavioral dispositions. (See; 2013, 7)
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One might have an attitude that is resistant to counter-evidence. I may dogmat-
ically believe that my guardians are my biological parents, despite DNA evidence
and friends and family members suggesting otherwise. Thus, there is a difference
between an attitude that is resistant to counter-evidence and one that thinks it will
survive new information. Recognizing this distinction, Lawlor develops a notion of
rational conviction, which is based on conviction. Rational conviction has two cen-
tral features. The first is good (or, what Bayesian theorists call weighty) evidence.
To illustrate, suppose Suzy tosses a coin four times and it comes up heads twice and
tails twice. Upon observing the throws, she might be inclined to think that the coin
is fair. If the coin, on the other hand, were tossed 10,000 times and comes up heads
5,118 times, that is much more weighty evidence for the proposition that the coin
is fair. It is important to note some significant aspects of weighty evidence. It can
be psychologically impactful. Lawlor writes: “Having weighty enough evidence puts
one in a position to anticipate no further change in the truth of one’s opinion.”134
Indeed, having weighty evidence “moves one from opinion to conviction.” Seeing the
coin flipped a handful of times might incline Suzy to believe that the evidence fa-
vors the coin being fair, while still entertain the possibility that more evidence will
change my mind. If, however, she sees the coin flipped 10,000 times with 5,118 heads,
she would rationally anticipate no rational change in her opinion on further inquiry.
Moreover, weighty evidence for conviction has implications on action. Thus, just how
weighty the evidence needs to be for conviction depends on the action and the stakes
involved. Betting my remaining years of freedom requires more weight of evidence
than betting a nickel.
134(See 2013, 8)
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Another feature of rational conviction is the rational anticipation that what one is
confident of will survive new information. Lawlor develops this property by adopting
Brian Skyrms idea of resiliency that aims to capture the ‘sureness’ that some of one’s
first-order probabilities enjoy. To see this, suppose Suzy has not seen a coin flipped
yet, but she has no reason to think it biased, and so her degree of credence that the
coin will land heads on the next throw is ½. After seeing the coin flipped 10,000 times
with 5,118 heads, her degree of credence that the coin will land heads on the next
throw is also (roughly) ½. But she is surer about it now. Skyrms suggests that as
theorists we do not need second-order probabilities about first-order probabilities to
capture this sureness. We can instead think in terms of one’s reluctance to change
one’s credences given more evidence. Put somewhat differently, we can think of how
much one’s initial credence changes, conditional on additional information. The less
change in one’s conditional credences, the more resilient one’s unconditional credence
is. Lawlor adopts Skyrms’ notion of resiliency, which is set forth as follows:
Resiliency of Pr(q)s being α = 1 − Maxi| α – Prj(q)| over p1. . . pn (where
the Prjs are gotten by conditionalizing on some truth functional compound
of the pis which is logically consistent with both q and its negation). 135
Focusing on the proposition q, assume the pis as propositions that encode informa-
tion about how the world is or might be. Put differently, the pis are epistemically 
possible propositions or ways the world might be for all one knows. The conditional 
probability of q given the information that pi measures one’s degree of credence in q 
135See Skyrms, Causal Necessity , 11-12
99
under the supposition that pi describes the world. In sum, Lawlor holds that rational
belief is driven by evidence and permits action without further inquiry because it is
based on sufficiently resilient credence.
Practical stakes help set the threshold
There are still aspects of rational conviction that have not been addressed, in-
cluding matters like a threshold, indeterminancy, absolute resiliency, etc., Lawlor
addresses each of these issues. For instance, Lawlor maintains that conviction is a
response to firmness of evidence – how much weight or firmness of evidence is needed
for conviction is determined in light of one’s practical stakes and interests in the
question at hand. She writes:
It is only if the evidence is firm enough (sufficiently unlikely to shift or be
undermined) in light of these interests, that one will be persuaded by it,
and form a conviction. Similarly, conviction requires resiliency of opinion,
but how much resiliency is required is itself determined in light of one’s
practical stakes and interests . . . Belief involves sufficiently resilient cre-
dence, where what is sufficiently resilient may change with features of the
context, broadly construed to include what is at stake in being right and




Lawlor’s goal is not to offer an algorithm that precisely spits out each case in 
which a person possess a rational conviction. Indeed, such a goal would require 
a book unto itself. Thus, some indeterminancy is to be expected, since it may be 
dicult to say precisely where the resiliency threshold is that turns one’s high degree 
of credence into a belief. She writes:“We do not need to digress far here, but it is 
worth noting that there may be imprecision in measures of resiliency.” This is to be 
expected, since we may only be able to assign rough or imprecise values to one’s 
credences, and these values in turn determine resiliency.
Absolute resiliency vs. restricted resiliency
Finally, Lawlor addresses the concern that there is always some information that 
would upset one’s conviction. It is always possible, for example, that the prosecutor 
has suborn perjury and so all the witnesses have given false testimony. Although they 
seemed very credible, it is still the case that one’s credence in losing might go down 
a bit conditional on this possibility. Should this matter? Should one then not have 
conviction even now on reading the news? Resiliency is a property of credences, and 
it is relative to the propositions one conditions on. Absolute resiliency in one sense 
involves no difference between conditional and unconditional credences. Whatever 
information one considers, one’s credence in q does not shift even a little bit. (For 
most empirical propositions, this is a tall order.) Absolute resiliency has another 
sense, involving little change in one’s conditional credences in q, over all manner of 
information. Given resource-bounded agents, the set of propositions to condition
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on in order to determine resiliency is a subset of the universe of propositions. This 
subset includes all and only those propositions that express information one judges it 
relevant to consider. So there are two aspects of resiliency thresholds: how close the 
conditional credences are to one’s unconditional credence, and how many propositions 
are conditioned on or considered relevant to determining resiliency.
Summation
Summarizing these points: resiliency for a target proposition q requires that for a 
set of relevant propositions {ki. . . kn} in context C, the conditional credences Pr (q |
ki) are not excessively lower than the unconditional credence Pr (q). We can further 
imagine that Pr (q | •) is somewhat indeterminate in nature and not numerically 
precise. These points suggest a revision in our statement of the resiliency threshold 
for rational belief: Resiliency Threshold (revised): It is epistemically rational for us 
to believe a proposition only if our degree of credence in it is suciently resilient in 
the context.
5.2.2 LRA & The Suciency Condition
Using Lawlor’s framework, I now have a more plausible model for a theory of re-
siliency, which will then explain what it means to satisfy the suciency condition. 
According to Lawlor, having a rational conviction implies that two conditions are 
met. One condition is that the belief is supported by weighty evidence. This is also 
one of the requirements to satisfying the suciency condition in each proceedings. 
Surely, we do not want the evidential support for the plaintiff’s narrative to be weak. 
Of course, some will ask How much evidence is needed for the support to be 
weighty? I will answer this question in two parts. First, I do not think it is pro-
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ductive to look for a quantitative answer. There are several factors137 involved in a
criminal case that are not amenable to saying something like at least 90% of all the
total evidence must support the plaintiff’s case. Indeed, a numerical answer would
engender more questions than it would answer. Second, and more importantly, the
answer to the above question is best answered by Lawlor’s second condition, accord-
ing to which, rational conviction requires that the agent believes that the matter is
settled . That is, usually when we think that a matter has been seettled it is because
we think there is enough evidential support to bring the inquiry to a close.
To be clear, stating that the matter is settled does not mean that there is, in
principle, no additional information that will change the fact-finder’s belief that that
plaintiff’s narrative is correct. That is, stating that the matter has been settled does
not imply absolute resiliency. Rather it means that if additional evidence related
to the case were added, the fact-finder’s belief that the defendant is guilty would
still survive. Stating that the matter is settled is another way of stating that the
fact-finder’s belief is resilient. Lawlor also spells this out as follows:
An agent is resilient for a target proposition q only if for a set of relevant
propositions {ki. . . kn} in context C, the conditional credences Pr (q | ki)
are not excessively lower than the unconditional credence Pr (q).
The formulation also requires some clarifying, if we want it to make sense of how it
137 For example, criminal cases differ in terms of categories. Most criminal systems 
for states across the United States divide their crimes into several different categories 
depending on the seriousness of the crime. The major categories include infractions, 
misdemeanors, and felonies.
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fits into the overall picture of the sufficiency condition. First, it is important to note 
that Lawlor mentions a target proposition q. In a criminal proceeding, there can be 
many target propositions, usually falling into one of two categories - the main and 
auxillary target propositions. The main target proposition is usually the claim that 
the defendant is guilty of all the charges that have been levelled against him. It is 
the major claim that ultimately states the defendant’s fate. For example, in a felony 
case, where the defendant is accused of armed robbery, the main target proposition 
might be that the defendant is guilty of aggravated robbery.
An auxillary target proposition, on the other hand, can be any target proposi-
tion that is used to determine the main target proposition. Thus, to continue with 
the above example, if the main target proposition is that the defendant is guilty 
of aggravated robbery, then an auxiliary target proposition might be that the de-
fendant was at the scene of the crime when the event occurred. There is also a 
dependence relation between the two classes of target propositions. The fact-finder’s 
belief about the main target proposition depends on her belief about the auxiliary 
target propositions. But the same is not true the other way around.
Lawlor’s formulation of resiliency also warrants a discussion of relevant proposi-
tions {ki. . . kn} in context C. In order to assess whether (and to what degree) an 
agent is resilient about a target proposition q, the proposition must be evaluated 
against the background of relevant propositions {ki. . . kn} in context C. These rel-
evant propositions should be understood as additional information that could be 
presented to the agent (or fact-finder) once the agent’s (or fact-finder’s) mind has 
been made up. The idea being that the agent is said to be resilient about a target 
proposition q when her credence about q does not waver much even when additional
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information is presented to her. Put somewhat differently, her credence about q
survives additional information.
It is important to point out, however, that Lawlor qualifies the type of additional
information that may be presented. Resiliency does not require little to no wavering
in the face of any additional propositions. Rather it requires little to no waver-
ing when being presented with any relevant propositions. Thus, there is a natural
restriction that is placed on the set of additional propositions that one may add to de-
termine whether her credence changes at all. Surely, there are some scenarios where
it would be irrational for the fact-finder’s credence not to undergo drastic change.
If, for example, the jury were to learn that the prosecution knowingly allowed the
use of perjured testimony during the trial and routinely withheld exculpatory evi-
dence during discovery, then such infractions would be grounds for disbelieving the
state has met her burden irrespective of what the jury may have heretofore believed.
Or, suppose that during the trial, someone other than the defendant credibly and
voluntarily confesses to committing all the charges levelled against the defendant.
In such a circumstance, it would be appropriate to return a not guilty verdict, even
if, prior to that, the fact-finder had a rational conviction that the plaintiff had met
her burden. But such scenarios are very rare and are consequently ignored when
considering additional information that would change the fact-finder’s belief in the
target proposition.
The above remarks lead me to making the following proposals:
• General rule: The sufficiency condition is met just in case the fact-finder has
a rational conviction that the standard of proof has been met for the proceeding
the case is in.
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• Preponderance of evidence standard: Requires the rational conviction that
it is more likely than not that the defendant is liable.
• Clear and convincing evidence standard: Requires the rational conviction
that is very likely that the defendant is liable.138
• Beyond reasonable doubt standard: Requires the rational conviction that
it is nearly certain that the defendant is guilty. 139
5.3 Is conviction just as onerous as knowledge?
Now that LRA has been presented, it should also be clear that it differs from 
other proposals stated in Chapter Three. One proposal, in particular, that I have 
attempted to distinguish my view from is Moss’ probabilistic knowledge account of 
legal proof. Although my and her accounts rely on a relevant alternatives account of 
knowledge from the contextualism literature, there are important aspects in which 
my account differs from hers. Perhaps the biggest difference centers on how we show 
what is required to satisfy the burden of proof. On her view, the fact-finder must 
know that the burden of proof has been satisfied in criminal proceedings, and she 
must know that the burden of proof has likely been satisfied in civil proceedings. As 
138 Put differently, the fact-finder must have the rational conviction that the defen-
dant’s liability is greater than .7.
139 Put differently, the fact-finder must have the rational conviction that the defen-
dant’s guilt is at least .95.
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stated previously, my view denies that knowledge is required to satisfy the burden 
of proof in any legal proceeding. Although I provide several arguments for rejecting 
knowledge-based accounts of legal proof, in this section I focus on one particular 
reason and how it relates to my requirement of rational conviction.
One reason for denying that knowledge is required for satisfying the burden of 
proof is that it would be overly demanding to require that the fact-finder knows 
that the burden of proof has been met. To my demandingness objection, Moss, and 
other proponents of knowledge-based accounts, may reply that knowledege accounts 
of legal proof are not the only ones that are demanding. Given that I require, in at 
least two proceedings, that the fact-finder has a rational conviction that the plaintiff 
has satisfied the burden of proof, this in some respects may be seen as demanding, 
indeed overly demanding.
My response to this objection is two-fold. First, I believe that I have offered a 
case for why it is reasonable for the fact-finder to have a rational conviction that 
the plaintiff has satisfied the burden of proof. I leave it now up to the reader to 
decide whether the case is a good one. In what I follows, I wish to point out why the 
demandingness objection that I raise against knowledge-based accounts are starkly 
different from the demandingness objection that may be levelled against my proposal. 
The chief ground for why I maintain that it is overly onerous to demand that the 
fact-finder knows that the plaintiff has met her burden is that I believe that it is 
quite possible for the burden of proof to be met in cases of wrongful conviction. It is 
quite possible for the plaintiff to demonstratively show that the defendant is at fault 
even if turns out that they are not at fault. My account, on the other hand, does not 
have this problem. By requiring that the fact-finder has a rational conviction that
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the burden of proof has been satisfied, that does not imply that the defendant is in
fact at fault. Thus, whatever one might mean by stating that LRA is demanding, it
is not akin to the way in which knowledge-based accounts are overly demanding.
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CHAPTER 6
LRA and the Desiderata
6.1 LRA and DNA evidence
In this Chapter, I return to the desiderata outlined in Chapter 2. I begin by 
showing that LRA respects DI, which requires an explanation for why DNA evidence 
is treated differently in contrast to other forms of statistical evidence. By the end 
of the discussion, it will become clear that the explanation that LRA provides for 
the exceptional treatment of DNA evidence matches intuitions on how we view DNA 
evidence.
6.1.1 DNA worked out
Recall in DNA that there is very strong DNA evidence supporting the claim that 
Defendant committed the crime of which he is being accused. LRA can capture 
why we think that Defendant is guilty of the charges. LRA holds that a finding for the 
defendant implies that a sufficiently high number of relevant alternatives have been 
eliminated. Furthermore, the sufficiency condition is satisfied only if the fact-finder 
has a rational conviction where having a rational conviction means (i) the fact-finder’s 
belief is supported by weighty evidence; and (ii) the fact-finder’s belief that the 
plaintiff met her burden is resilient.
I believe that the facts associated with DNA evidence typically leads to our hav-
ing a rational conviction in most claims established by DNA evidence. To see this, 
note that when a person’s DNA profile is said to match the DNA sample collected at
109
a crime scene at every locus tested, we might still want to evaluate the probability 
of finding the DNA profile in someone else. That person is assumed to be a ran-
dom member of the population of possible suspects. In order to rule out a random 
person, forensic scientists calculate the frequency of the profile in the most relevant 
population. The frequency is bettter known as the random-match probability, which 
is an estimate of the answer to the question: What is the probability that a person 
other than the suspect, randomly selected from the population, will have this profile?
Forensic scientists believe that the smaller that probability, the greater the likelihood
that the two DNA samples came from the same person.140 Indeed, the calculated
probability of a match between suspect and DNA evidence is usually one in many
millions or billions. 141
By peering further into the random match probability, several connections between
it and the requirements for rational conviction can be made. Recall that the smaller
the probability the greater the likelihood that the two DNA samples came from the 
same person. But another point might be made here: the smaller the probability the
more possible worlds are eliminated. This should be easy to see. As I decrease the 
140 Put somewhat differently, if the probability is very small, then either the two 
samples came from the same person or a very unlikely coincidence has occurred.
141 For example in Knight v. State (1993), the expert stated that the probability 
of selecting an unrelated individual of the population from the same race as Knight 
who had a genetic profile matching the semen taken from the victim was one in ten 
billion. Also, in Dubose v. State, the jury was told that there is a 1 in 500 million 
probability that the appellant’s particular DNA pattern would appear in the North 
American black population.
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probability that the sample came from the someone other than suspect, I am also 
eliminating many, indeed, very many relevant possible worlds.
Moreover, the elimination of possible worlds is tied to weighty evidence. As one’s 
overall evidence grows in favoring one side over the other, this also means the elimi-
nation of possible worlds that are incompatible with the targeted claim. Given the 
number of individuals that are generally ruled out in DNA cold-hit cases, this pre-
sumably explains why courts have looked upond such cases favorably. The more 
possible worlds that are ruled out the higher degree of certitude is achieved in con-
cluding the person whom the two DNA samples match is the perpetrator. Indeed, 
courts presumably regard DNA cold-hit cases with astronomical match probabilities 
as having an in-built weightiness attached to them.
A third connection can be stated. As stated in chapter 5, there is a strong 
connection between weighty evidence and resilience. Specifically, the weightier the 
evidence the more resilient one becomes, even if given additional information. Thus, 
the more astronomically low the match probability is, the more possible worlds are 
eliminated. Furthermore, the more resilient I am likely to be in concluding that the 
suspect is the perpetrator. Finally, weightiness and resilience are the two essential 
ingredients for rational conviction. Thus, an astronomically low RMP can in turn 
generate rational conviction in the fact-finder, provided the probability is supported 
by weighy evidence that produces resilience.
With this in mind, we can easily predict how LRA would handle DNA, where the 
match made between the DNA profile recovered from the victim’s neck and a DNA 
databank of offenders supports a 1 in 1010 chance (or, an extremely low probability) 
that someone other than Defendant ’s DNA was found on the victim’s neck. Most
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of us would believe that there is ample evidence to conclude that the DNA evidence
collected from the victim’s neck and the DNA profile match on CODIS belong to one 
and the same individual. Furthermore, our belief is resilient. That is, we think that
questions regarding whether the DNA evidence found on the victim’s neck actually
belonging to Defendant have been settled. Were additional information added, it is
very unlikely that our belief would change.142
6.1.2 Brawl worked out
While the fact-finder’s belief that Defendant committed the crime in DNA sat-
isfies the conditions for being called a conviction, the same cannot be said about the
fact-finder’s belief in the guilt of the defendant in Brawl. At first glance, in Brawl ,
we might be tempted to think that a greater than .95 chance that Defendant is guilty
is fairly high. However, if we look at the numbers used to generate that probabil-
ity, what we see is that by randomly selecting one of the protesters there is still a
1 in 21 chance that an innocent person is wrongly punished. This fraction is not 
weighty. Under no inquiry would we conclude that the numbers will generate the 
142 Historically, DNA evidence carries a really strong and persuasive power in Court 
because the random match probability (RMP), defined to be the probability that 
a person picked at random has the same DNA profile as the evidentiary sample, is 
very low if several unlinked loci are typed. For a a 13-locus CODIS profile, typical 
RMPs are on the order of 10−14 to 10−15. Such a low RMP implies that a particular 
DNA profile has a high probability of being unique. Of course, the method of using 
(RMP) to secure a conviction is just a roundabout way of displaying relevant alter-
natives being eliminated. By eliminating enough alternatives to a hypothesis, the 
uneliminated hypothesis left standing is often seen as unique - that is, the correct 
one.
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kind of belief resiliency that is needed to hold onto a belief in the midst of additional 
(and, possibly, conflicting) information. We may grant that the fact-finder partially 
believes that Defendant took part in the brawl. Indeed, we may even grant that the 
fact-finder’s belief is (partially) reslient. But it is not nearly as resilient as it would 
need to be to satisfy the suciency condition.
Before moving on to how LRA handles DII, it is worth emphasizing a point that 
is easily overlooked. LRA not only gives the right rulings in DNA and Brawl , but 
it also captures our reasoning in both cases. Consider, for example, Brawl . Many 
of us think that the court should not return a guilty verdict against the randomly 
selected protester. Isn’t the reason why we think this, because we think, inter alia, 
that the evidence supporting the belief that Defendant is guilty is not very weighty?
If so, then this seems to be what LRA means by concluding that a suciently high 
number of legally relevant alternatives to the protester actually being guilty would 
not have been eliminated were punishment to be meted out on him.
Similar points can be made about how LRA handles DNA. We seem to think that 
the court should return a guilty verdict against Defendant. Perhaps our reasoning 
is that the chances that someone other than Defendant committing the crime is 
suciently low. Of course, if this represents our reasoning, then that is just another 
way of saying that a suciently high number of relevant alternatives to Defendant 
being guilty have been eliminated.
6.1.3 Possible Objection
No theory is without its critics, and LRA is no exception. In this Subsection, I 
will address one possible objection to my proposal. In Section 6.1, I argue that the
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chances of a pro-claimant finding in DNA will come down to whether a sufficiently 
high number of relevant alternatives to the claimaint’s story have been eliminated. If 
the elimination of enough relevant alternatives suffices for a finding for the claimant, 
we might wonder, then, whether something similar can be said of Brawl -like cases 
(i.e., non-DNA cases that rely only on probabilistic evidence). In the original Brawl , 
it is unlikely that the fact-finder will return a guilty verdict, given that not a suffi-
ciently high amount of legally relevant alternatives to the accused being guilty are 
eliminated. But, suppose the set up had been different. Suppose instead of twenty 
one protesters (out of which one is randomly selected), there are five hundred thou-
sand (or, even five million) all but one of whom is responsible for a disturbance that 
culminates in a member of the legal force suffereing grave injuries. If one person 
is randomly selected, then there would be a 1 in 5 x 105 chance that an innocent 
person would be menaced were we to mete out punishment. Given the extremely 
low chance of an innocent man being punished, wouldn’t LRA be committed, as the 
objection goes, to conclude that the system of randomly selecting one member from 
that population can generate a result that satisfies the reasonable doubt burden?
Moreover, wouldn’t we be obliged to punish the randomly selected protester?
Several thoughts are in order. To begin, the above objection provides an example 
that is a natural consequence of my proposal. I accept the consequence for a couple 
of reasons. First, if a non-prejudicial mechanism routinely yields a very high degree 
of certitude for the matter in dispute, then it should not be immediately discarded. 
Indeed, it would prove as reliable as DNA evidence. The issue, of course, with non-
DNA forms of naked statistical evidence is that they do not routinely yield the same 
degree of certitude. If they did, we might expect to see attitudinal changes with
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respect to cases relying only on probabilistic evidence.
My second reason for standing firm on the afore-mentioned consequence comes 
from the growing number of court cases suggesting that courts are starting to seem 
sympathetic to my position. First, some courts have expressed a willingness to allow 
probabilistic evidence when it assists with the establishment of a useful fact. In 
State v Pankow , a Wisconsin appeals court allowed a testimony by a statistician 
who stated that the probability that 3 infants out of 20 in the same household would 
die of sudden infant death syndrome (SIDS) over a 5-year period was “one thousand 
times smaller than 9.1 in one trillion” (p. 918). The court reasoned that such 
testimony was permissible because its “sole purpose was to meet Pankow’s defense 
theory that the deaths were attributable to SIDS”.143
Courts have also shown a willingness to admit statistical evidence when it rebuts 
a claim. In State v. Briggs (1989), a Washington appeals court ruled that it was “ob-
viously useful” for the jury to hear a physician’s testimony as to the probability that 
a stutter in certain situations to rebut the defendant’s argument that the absence of 
testimony than an assailant stuttered exonerated the stutterer-defendant.144 Finally, 
some courts are now open to considering the use of statistical base rate evidence 
when such evidence helps resolve the ultimate issue.145 In U.S. v. Rogers (1985), a 
federal appellate court ruled that it was not wrong to allow testimony that only 2 




out of 1,800 bank robberies in the Los Angeles area involved a person wearing a ban-
danna: “The fact that very few robberies involve this garb makes it more likely that
the same person committed both robberies.”146 Rulings such as the above, coupled
with a reduction of restrictions on the use of expert witnesses and scientific testimony
(Feinberg, 1989), suggest that reluctance to naked statistical evidence may be on the
wane.
6.2 LRA and the Adaptiveness Requirement
Another advantage to LRA is that it is able to meet the adaptive requirement in a
straightforward way. Given that a finding for the claimant requires that a sufficiently
high number of relevant alternatives to the claimant’s narrative be eliminated, this
requirement is amenable to the various standards of proof used in different proceed-
ings. In cases where the standard of proof requires preponderance of evidence, the
number of eliminated legally relevant alternatives needed to find for the plaintiff will
be less than the number of eliminated legally relevant alternatives needed to find for
the plaintiff where the standard of proof is clear and convincing evidence. Finally,
neither of those standards will require the elimination of as many legally relevant
alternatives as that of the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Recall, in Section 3, Moss’ probabilistic account of knowledge was the only frame-
work that meets the adaptive requirement. Similar to my approach, Moss also em-
ploys a relevant alternatives account of knowledge as the basis of her view. Yet, on
her approach, a standard of proof is met when the fact-finder knows that the set of
146 Ibid
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probability spaces according to which the probability of guilt or liability meets or 
exceeds the relevant threshold for the standard. Simply put, in criminal and civil 
proceedings, a finding for the plaintiff implies that the fact-finder has knowledge that 
the legal burden is met. I, on the other hand, do not require that the fact-finder have 
knowledge that the burden of proof. Having a strong belief, without knowing, that 
the standard of proof via eliminating enough relevant alternatives can be enough.
6.3 LRA and Wrongful Convictions
6.3.1 A Worked-out Example
Finally, LRA respects DIII. Indeed, this is one consequence of not requiring that 
the fact-finder know that the standard of proof is met. To see this, consider the 
following example. Suppose that Billy is arrested and tried for shoplifitng. The 
prosecution produces video footage that shows him stealing over $4,000.00 worth of 
merchandise. Additionally, the police find all the stolen merchandise at his home. 
Billy claims that he is innocent but his alibi does not check out. More importantly, 
he is not able to explain how the merchandise ended up in his home. At trial, it only 
takes the jury an hour of deliberation to return a guilty verdict. A year after the trial, 
the prosecution learns that Billy has an identical twin, Bishop, who was separated 
from Billy at birth. Although Billy does not know about Bishop, the latter has been 
studying and following the former. Suppose Bishop has become a career criminal. In 
his latest scheme, he contrives a plan to make his brother suffer, since their biological 
mother chose Billy over him. The plan involves Bishop assuming the identity of his 
twin brother, stealing the merchandise, and planting the items at Billy’s home in
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order to make it appear that Billy shoplifted. Suppose that law enforcement was not
negligent in failing to know about Bishop. They checked out every lead and did their
due diligence. In fact, the only reason they learned about Bishop and his devious
plan is that the latter felt guilt ridden and confessed to law enforcement what he
did. We now have a case of wrongful conviction, where the defendant is found guilty
on the basis of very strong but ultimately misleading evidence.
A pictorial representation of this case on LRA is provided in Figure 6.3. Assume
we are in a scenario in which satisfying the burden of proof requires that only 50
worlds are eliminated. According to the number of dotted boxes, the standard is
met. The jury finds for the plaintiff and is therefore in one of the f worlds. Never-
theless, given what we know, actuality is one of the non-f worlds that has not been
eliminated. Thus, we have a case in which the burden of proof is met and yet the
accused person is innocent.
          
          
          
          
  f f f f   
          
          
Figure 6.3
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6.3.2 The Elusiveness of Reasonable Doubt
Above I show that, on LRA, there can be at times wrongful convictions. The 
feature that allows my account to countenance wrongful convictions is the denial 
that meeting the burden of proof implies that the fact-finder knows that the burden 
of proof has been met. But, does my rejection of a knowledge-based account come 
at costs? If so, what are they? In this Subsection, I examine a putative advantage 
Moss believes her account possesses as a result of requiring that that the fact-finder 
knows the burden of proof is met in order to find for the plaintiff.
Moss argues that one attractive feature of her probabilistic-knowledge account of 
legal proof is that it can capture a mystery in the law. The mystery has to do with 
defining the reasonable doubt standard. Some judges have unsuccessfully tried to 
develop a definition of reasonable doubt.147 While others have been strongly opposed 
to the project.148 The upshot is that we are left with a standard of proof that no 
one seems to have a very good handle on.
Despite the difficulty with defining reasonable doubt, Moss believes there is a 
deeper reason for it being dicult to explain. She then introduces a concept that 
is also elusive: knowledge. As stated above, Moss adopts a relevant alternatives 
147 See (Whitman; 2008, 2)
148 To quote a representative opinion from the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, 
“We are at a loss to understand why trial courts in this jurisdiction continue to give 
such an instruction when we have condemned them from territorial days to the 
present ... it is error for the trial judge to try to define reasonable doubt.” (See, 
Jones v. Oklahoma, 554 P.2d 830, 835 (1976)
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account of knowledge. On this view, an agent knows p only if she eliminates all
relevant possibilities to p. One attractive feature of this theory of knowledge is that
it provides a manageable way of making knowledge ascriptions. The agent does not
need to eliminate all alternatives to p, only the relevant ones. However, as Moss
points out, a relevant alternatives account of knowledge can also be elusive. The
reason for this is that whenever one considers an alternative to p, no matter how
recherche, it thereby becomes relevant. Thus, even the exotic alternatives that do
not need to be ruled out get consideration once we give attention to them.
Moss then builds upon the connection between the elusiveness of knowledge and
the elusiveness of the reasonable doubt burden of proof by suggesting that the former
best explains the latter. She writes: “The more we say in an effort to spell out the
difference between reasonable and unreasonable doubts, the more we call attention to
the possibilities that jurors shouldn’t be considering”.149 Several points seem to be in
order about the reasonable doubt standard being explained by a relevant alternatives
account of knowledge. First, Moss’ point has some initial appeal. Prima facie, it
seems plausible to hold that if two things share a common property, then perhaps
the connection is best understood in terms of one of the items being part of the
explanation of the other. Second, it should also be noted that Moss’ ground for
holding that the elusiveness of knowledge explains why it is so difficult to explain
reasonable doubt is not based on mere coincidence. She supports her claim with
arguments. Third, given the connection knowledge has with the reasonable doubt
burden of proof, Moss then claims that to satisfy the latter means that the fact-finder
knows that the burden of proof has been met.
149See (Moss; 2019, 7)
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In denying that knowledge is required for an account of legal proof, we might, 
then, think that my account is unable to explain the elusiveness of defining the 
reasonable doubt standard of proof. However, I do not believe that this follows. In 
the rest of this Subsection, I aim to show how LRA accounts for the elusiveness of 
defining reasonable doubt.
Recall that on LRA a finding for the claimant requires that a sufficiently high 
number of legally relevant alternatives to the claimant’s narrative be eliminated. I 
further claimed that one way to measure whether enough alternatives have been 
ruled out is by determining the chances that an innocent person would be wrongly 
punished by relying only on statistical evidence. But I refrained from assigning an 
ideal threshold. One reason for my reluctance is that sometimes there are other 
factors unrelated to the elimination of legally relevant alternatives that get factored 
into the fact-finder’s deliberation. These factors include, but are not limited to, 
matters that are either extraneous to the case or explicitly prohibited by the judge. 
Consider the following case, which I will call PRIVILEGE, which is short for broken 
doctor-patient privilege:
PRIVILEGE: Suppose Stefano is facing serious charges of crimes he actually did 
not commit. During trial, Antonio, another person of interest, divulges to Sally, his 
psychiatrist, in her oce and during a counseling session, that he actually committed 
the crime that Stefano is being charged with. Despite the confession to the shrink 
being protected under doctor-patient privilege, Sally discloses the confession to a 
local newspaper, which then disseminates the confession to the public. The jury also 
learns of the confession. When the judge learns of the psychiatrist’s misconduct, he 
forbids the jury for using Antonio’s confession as a basis for acquitting Stefano, given
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that the psychiatrist broke the terms of confidentiality.
Although this is a somewhat unusual case, hopefully you begin to see my point.
Despite the judge’s direct instruction to the jury to disregard the confession, it is very
unlikely each individual juror will be able to. Indeed, it seems more likely that most
jurors will require more evidence than what is usually reasonable to convict Stefano.
This is because something that is prohibited has become a factor to consider, even
if it is considered implicitly.
My point in this example could be generalized: It seems that for any case there
are factors, including irrelevant ones, that may impede each juror from properly
deliberating only the merits of the case. These are among the reasons why I hold
that, in providing a descriptive account of how the fact-finder determines whether
or not to find for the plaintiff, it is nearly impossible to assign a threshold, which,
when met, suffices for a finding for the plaintiff. Thus, the way LRA handles the
mystery of defining the reasonable doubt burden of proof is by calling attention to
what likely happens in many cases; namely, other factors impertinent to eliminating
relevant alternatives tend to crowd the juror’s deliberation, which then makes it
nearly impossible to define what is and isn’t reasonable doubt.
6.4 LRA and Codicils
6.4.1 The Plan
The preceding sections of Chapter 6 show that LRA properly respects DI - DIII. 
But perhaps the most challenging desideratum is DIV, which seeks to determine 
whether there is independent justification for the satisfaction of each desideratum on
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LRA. Put somewhat differently, is LRA’s satisfaction of each desideratum only by
specially made features - that is, epicycles - designed only to satisfy the requirement?
To answer this question, I will proceed as follows: First, I briefly review how LRA
handles each desideratum. Then, in the process of each discussion, I consider whether
there are independent reasons for that feature existing on LRA. If no independent
reason can be provided, then obviously LRA’s satisfaction of that desideratum is
ad hoc, and consequently, LRA would not satisfy DIV. If, however, there is an
independent reason for each feature on LRA that satisfies each desideratum, then
LRA respects the last desideratum.
6.4.2 Codicils and DNA evidence
In Subsection 6.1, I show that LRA can account for the court’s special treatment
of DNA evidence. The explanation is that DNA profiling systematically eliminates
a sufficiently high amount of relevant alternatives. When there is a match between
a DNA sample collected at a crime scene and a DNA profile in CODIS, we have
no trouble concluding that the sample and the profile belong to one and the same
individual on the grounds that the profiling results in the elimination of enough
relevant alternatives. It turns, out however, that if the need to explain the special
treatment of DNA in the law were not a desideratum, LRA would still have the
feature that the elimination of a sufficiently high number of relevant alternatives is
central to satisfying a burden of proof. One reason that the feature would remain is
that it seems to capture all cases where naked statistics is sufficient for liability, not
just those involving DNA profiling.
Consider, for example, Kaminsky v. Hertz Corp. (1979), where a Michigan Appel-
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late court ruled that stipulated base rate evidence, which indicates that Hertz owns 
90% of all yellow vehicles bearing the Hertz logo “establishes a prima facie showing of 
ownership or control sucient to prevent a summary judgment [for the defendant].” 
Similarly, in Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories (1980), a plaintiff argued that multiple 
manufacturers were selling defective products and that one of those products harmed 
her. Plaintiff, however, could not prove which manufacturer in particular harmed 
her. The California Supreme Court ruled that in such cases, liability may be im-
posed to manufacturers in proportion with their share of the market for the defective 
product.
The foregoing cases show the rare instances in which courts find for the plaintiff on 
the basis of naked statistics. Notice, however, that LRA can easily capture why, in 
such cases, naked statistics suffice for a pro-plaintiff liability finding: the fact-finder 
determined that a suciently high number of relevant alternatives to the plaintiff’s 
narrative were ruled out. Thus, LRA’s satisfaction of DI is not ad hoc.
6.4.3 Codicils and the adaptive requirement
It should be apparent that LRA’s satisfaction of DII is not ad hoc either. Recall, 
that what the plaintiff must prove in criminal proceedings is much stronger than 
what she must prove in civil proceedings. LRA can capture this too. Although the 
requirement in each proceeding is to eliminate a sucently high number of relevant 
alternatives, what counts as sucient is relative to the proceeding that the case is 
in. Thus, in a balance of probability proceeding, the number of eliminated relevant 
alternatives sufficient for a pro-plaintiff finding are not nearly as high as the number 
of eliminated relevant alternatives needed for a guilty verdict in criminal court. Thus,
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it is the flexibiity of the LRA machinery that enables it to satisfy DII.
But the machinery of LRA is not limited to just capturing the various burdens of 
proof in the law. In this chapter alone, consider the range of cases that are captured 
by the flexibility of LRA. For example, in Subsection 6.4.2, I show how the LRA 
machinery captures two cases in which naked statistics suce for liability. Moreover, 
in Subsection 6.1, I show how the machinery captures our intuitive judgments in 
Brawl and DNA - two naked statistics cases that most people think should result 
in different findings. Thus, the flexibility of LRA serves many purposes than just 
satisfying DII.
6.4.4 Codicils and wrongful conviction
Finally, LRA’s satisfaction of DIII, as will become clear, does not resort to 
employing codicils. Wrongful convictions are possible on LRA, given that the fact-
finder need not eliminate all relevant alternatives to meet the burden of proof in a 
given proceeding. Thus, so long as a suciently high number of alternatives have 
been eliminated, the fact-finder may return a guilty verdict. But such a requirement 
can occasionally lead to the conviction of an innocent defendant.
It should be noted, however, that the denial that all relevant alternatives be 
eliminated for legal factfinding is just part of the story. Recall that LRA is based 
on the relevant alternatives account of knowledge, according to which knowing some 
proposition p implies the elimination of all relevant alternatives to p. Thus, by 
denying that the fact-finder needs to eliminate all relevant alternatives to satisfy 
a standard of proof, LRA is ultimately denying that the fact-finder needs to know 
that all relevant alternatives are eliminated. This further means that it is the denial
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that knowledge is necessary for legal fact finding that allows there to be wrongful
convictions on LRA.
But are there other reasons for LRA to deny that knowledge is necessary for legal
fact finding? I believe the answer is yes . As stated in Chapter 5, the central reason
for LRA’s rejection of the fact-finder knowing that the burden of proof is met is not
to allow cases of wrongful convictions. Rather, it is to accurately reflect that the law
does not require the fact-finder to have knowledge either. Indeed, were the law to
require knowledge, then this would have detrimental effects in the law. Many cases
in which the trier of fact would have found for the plaintiff would likely have resulted




The foregoing chapters show some strengths of LRA, particularly in how it re-
spects several desiderata. Of course, there are many other desirable properties we
might want a theory of individualized evidence to possess besides those I state in
Chapter Two. In the philosophy of law literature, for example, discussions about
individualized evidence often focus on solving legal puzzles. Given the interest in
such puzzles then, we might wonder how my proposal fares with some legal puzzles
that are generated by, among other things, probabilities. In this chapter, I discuss
how LRA handles one such legal puzzle: The Gatecrasher Paradox (also known as
The Gatecrasher case).
7.1 Understanding the Gatecrasher
The Gatecrasher case was introduced by Laurence Jonathan Cohen (1977) and 
has been debated in the literature with some minor variations. For convenience, I 
will use the following version:
Consider, for example, a case in which it is common ground that 499 people paid 
for admission to a rodeo, and that 1,000 are counted on the seats, of whom A is one. 
Suppose no tickets were issued and there can be no testimony as to whether A paid 
for admission or climbed over the fence. So by any plausible criterion of mathemat-
ical probability there is a .501 probability, on the admitted facts, that he did not 
pay. The mathematical theory would apparently imply that in such circumstances
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the rodeo organizers are entitled to judgement against A for the admission-money, 
since the balance of probability (and also the difference between prior and posterior 
probabilities) would lie in their favour. But it seems manifestly unjust that A should 
lose his case when there is an agreed mathematical probability of as high as .499 that 
he in fact paid for admission.
Indeed, if the organizers were really entitled to judgement against A, they would 
presumably be equally entitled to judgement against each person in the same situa-
tion as A. So they might conceivably be entitled to recover 1,000 admission-moneys, 
when it was admitted that 499 had actually been paid. The absurd injustice of this 
suces to show that there is something wrong somewhere. But where? The paradox 
poses a conundrum. On the one hand, from a balance of probability standpoint, there 
seems to be grounds for each rodeo attendee being held liable. On the other hand, 
most people, Cohen included, believe that it would be wrong to impose liability on a 
randomly selected attendee based on naked statistical evidence. If the plaintiff would 
be entitled to receive damages from attendee A, then the plaintiff would be entitled 
to seek damages from every other attendee, based on the same naked statistics. By 
parity of reasoning, plaintiff would be legally entitled to force all attendees who did 
not crash the gate to pay twice.150
Since Cohen penned his famous example, scores of papers and commentaries have 
been written in attempts to resolve the Gatecrasher’s Paradox . Attempts range 
from discounting the statistical evidence at play to proposing an additional legal 
150 As Nunn writes, “Once the 502nd defendant has been found liable for trespass, 
there is a certainty that at least one innocent rodeo attendee has been found liable.”
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rule which would require that evidence be tailrord to a single defendant.151 Before
discussing how LRA addresses the problem that the Gatecrasher Paradox presents,
it is worthwhile to discuss historical responses detailing the various approaches and
legal doctrines that commentators have grappled with.
7.2 Historical Solutions
7.2.1 Keynesian evidential weight
In Chapter Five, I discuss the concept of Keynesian weight in order to develop
the notion of resilience that makes up the suciency condition. It turns out that
Keynesian weight (with some variations in terminology) is also tied to the reason
some believe that liability should not be imposed on a random spectator in the
Gatecrasher . The idea can be found in Cohen (1977), David Kaye (1979), Richard
Posner (1999) and Alex Stein (2005). The basic idea, according to this view, is that
there is something dubious in the Gatecrasher Case: Why is there no other evidence
than naked statistical evidence?152 Why has the organizer of the rodeo not produced 
151 Here is a more comprehensive account. Some evaluate the paradox under, what 
I will call, a reconceptualized burden of proof: (See Chen; 2013, 1269 -71) Others 
defend the plaintiff (See Eggleston; 1980, 678). Still others discuss the paradox 
in conjunction with the Blue Bus problem (See Fienberg; 1986, 693 - 98). Others 
discount the statistical evidence at play in the Gatecrasher’s Paradox (See Kaye; 
1979, 36-39) Some attempt to resolve the paradox by proposing an additional legal 
rule which would require that evidence be tailored to a single defendant, rather than 
allowing evidence to remain applicable to an entire population of possible defendants.
(See Williams; 1979, 297 - 301)
152 This type of inquiry can also be applied to the Prison Riot Case and the Blue
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any evidence that the defendant did not pay for admission, other than the brute
fact that the defendant was in attendance at the rodeo? Have serious attempts to
secure more evidence been made? The absence of evidence seems to suggest that
the investigations are sloppy. According to Posner, it is this suspicion that gives
us qualms about verdicts against the defendant in these cases.153 In the word’s of
Stein, the evidence against the defendant in a case like the Gatecrasher Case ’is not
weighty because most of the evidence that could verify or refute it is missing’154 This
can be even expressed in terms of second-order beliefs: the degree of our second-order
belief, that additional inquiries would not decrease the probability of the hypothesis
against the defendat below the standard of proof, is too low to find for the plaintiff
on the existing evidence. Finally, David Kaye points out that in the Gatecraseher
little is needed for additional evidence to change the probability of the hypothesis
dramatically.155
Bus Case.
153 (See 1999; 1509)
154 (See Stein; 2005, 85)
155 (See Kaye; 1979, 107) More fully, Kaye’s view is that there is a conflict between 
objective and subjective probabilities. He begins by distinguishing between two 
probabilities by which we can analyze the naked statistical evidence in the Paradox: 
objective and subjective. Objective probabilities denote the chances or the odds 
that an event will occur. applied to the Gatecrasher, this probability indicates that 
each rodeo has a slightly greater than 50% likelihood of membership in the class of
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tresspassers. Kaye also discusses problems with an unwavering commitment to just 
quantitative evidence. The hallmark of a trial, beit civil or criminal, is the evaluation 
of competing narratives. However, an over reliance quantitative evidence educes the 
trial’s traditional narrative format to mere background statistics. Moreover, the 
accuracy decreases as the probative force of corresponding qualitative evidence is 
lost.
As will become clear, Kaye’s view of subjective probabilities is more sanguine. The 
subjective probabilities combine quantitative evidence with a desire for corresponding 
qualitative support. So, a court could conceivably calculate subjective probabilities 
in two stages. It begins by calculating the objective probabilities and later discounts 
it in order to incentivize plaintiffs to do more than produce base rate evidence. It’s 
easy to see the implications this might have on the Gatecrasher. A court calculating 
subjective probabilities might begin with the 50.1% objective probability that any 
given deffendant tresspasses, and then discount it in order to also require correspond-
ing qualitative evidence. This strategy, were it to be used, would seem to surmount 
some of the unfairness concerns raised above.
Kaye’s second response is more piercing. He argues that the 50.1% chance that 
any one of the thousand rodeo attendees is actually a gatercrasher is misleading. 
The probability, taken by itself, fails to take into consideration the possibility of 
exculpatory evidence that could be admitted but is withheld. As Kaye writes, “Hence, 
if it is even slightly more likely that the rodeo organizers would have been able to 
come forward with more evidence about how the defendant A came onto the premises 
without paying if he had actually done” (See Kaye; 103-107) so, the 50.1% chance 
that defendant A is a gatecrasher is an inflated mischaracterization. Thus, according
131
7.2.2 Injustice
7.2.2.1 Glanville Williams’s view
“Weightiness considerations” are not the only factors that some scholars adduce 
as grounds for why liability should not be imposed in the Gatecrasher . Glanville 
Williams (1979), for example, believes that naked statistics is not sufficient to find 
for the plaintiff, because it is an injustice done to the randomly selected defendant. 
Indeed, Williams argues that the fact-finder should never return a verdict for the 
plaintiff who does not tie the evidence to a specific defendant. This means that a 
plaintiff cannot simply choose a random individual out of a population of potential 
defendants. Instead, what the plaintiff needs in order to prevail is evidence tailored 
specifically to the defendant on the stand.
Williams further argues that the injustice created by the Gatecrasher could be 
eliminated through an apportionment system by which damages are awarded not 
solely based on the defendant’s proportionate fault, but instead in proportion to 
that defendant’s "fault-plus-probability." Such a system of damage apportionment 
would reflect the disconcerting link between the defendant and the naked statistical 
evidence used against him at trial. Additionally, it would reduce the award to a 
to Kaye, a fairminded juror could hold two apparently conflicting beliefs. On the 
one hand, she could believe the naked statistical evidence against the Gatecrasher 
defendants. But, owing to external factors-such as withheld evidence of a particular 
defendant’s innocence, she could also decrease the probability of that defendant’s 
guilt to a figure below one-half.
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plaintiff who relied solely on naked statistical evidence, incentivizing the production
of additional evidence.156
7.2.2.2 Sir Richard Eggleston’s view
Acting in accordance to putative principles of justice in the Gatecrasher does not
always mean that the fact-finder must refrain from imposing liability. Sometimes, it
may mean that the fact-finder ought to impose liability - at least that is Sir Richard
Eggleston’s position. Similar to Williams, Eggleston’s analysis of the Gatecrasher’s
Paradox appeals to concepts like justice and fairness. But unlike Williams, Eggleston
believes that the real injustice is done to the plaintiff . He writes: "Any injustice in-
volved in giving judgment against the defendant in the rodeo case does not outweigh
the injustice of refusing a remedy to the plaintiff who has the odds in his favor."157
Eggleston acknowledges that there might be grounds to reduce or prevent the poten-
tial injustice for defendants by decreasing judgments. But, Eggleston focuses on the
counter justice concern. According to Eggleston, by permitting attribution schemes
in support of the defendants, we diminish the possibility of recovery of damages for
the plaintiff. Thus, Eggleston finds no serious injustice done to the defendant in the
Gatecrasher’s Paradox and claims that naked statistical evidence is sufficient for a
plaintiff to recover.
156 (See Williams; 1979)
157 (See Eggleston; 1980)
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7.3 LRA and the Gatecrasher Paradox
7.3.1 LRA’s solution
Our discussion so far considers several historical solutions to the Gatecrasher 
Paradox . Answers range from providing reasons for and against imposing liability 
on a random spectator, with the majority of the solutions siding with not imposing 
liability. The solution that LRA proposes also claims that liability should not be 
imposed on the defendant. To see this, consider what it would take, on LRA, for a 
randomly selected spectator to be held liable for gatecrashing. The theory requires 
that we start by determining whether a sufficiently large number of relevant alter-
natives to the claimant’s narrative would be eliminated were defendant accused of 
gatecrashing. LRA provides two reasons for why it is very unlikely that the fact-finder 
would eliminate a sufficiently high number of relevant alternatives. The first seems 
obvious. Suppose a random spectator were accused of gatecrashing on the basis of 
bare statistics alone. The fact-finder would not be able to completely elim-inate the 
possibility that defendant is one of the attendees who actually paid for admission. This 
means then that the fact-finder would not find defendant liable.
Based on the features of LRA, there is another explanation it offers for why a pro-
plaintiff ruling is unlikely. To see this, suppose again defendant is randomly selected 
from the population of spectators. He is subsequently tried. Finally suppose, at 
some point, the fact-finder is able to eliminate a fair number of alternatives, all of 
which support the conclusion that defendant did in fact gatecrash. According to 
LRA, we must then ask how resilient the fact-finder’s belief about the defendant’s 
apparent guilt would be if additional, albeit, conflicting, evidence were presented. If
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we assume that the only evidence heretofore in support of the defendant gatecrashing 
is the base rate evidence presented in Section 7.1, then there seems to be many pieces 
of conflicting information that, if presented, would raise the probability of the fact-
finder’s belief changing. For example, suppose that there is a VIP section in the 
stadium designated only for those who paid cash in person and there is evidence 
that defendant viewed the sporting event in that section. Or, suppose defendant 
shows the transaction of the ticket purchase by pulling up his bank records. Any 
of these scenarios, if realized, would raise the possibility of the fact-finder’s belief 
changing. Thus, if there is little (to no) resiliency in the fact-finder’s belief that 
defendant gatecrashed, then this is a sign that a suciently high number of relevant 
alternatives have not been eliminated.
One further point needs to be mentioned here. While I maintain that Cohen’s 
1977 version of the Gatecrasher requires that the fact-finder refrain from imposing 
liability, that does not mean that all versions of the Gatecrasher must not impose 
liability on the defendant who is randomly selected. Given what I have argued 
above, there is in principle some cases of the Gatecrasher where it could be said that 
a suciently large number of relevant alternatives have been eliminated such that 
I would be committed to concluding that a pro-plaintiff liability verdict would be 
permissible. Consider, for example, a case in which 6,999,999.499 people paid for 
admission to some world event but that 7,000,000,000 are counted on the seats. I 
believe that randomly selecting a defendant could, in princple, produce a rational 
conviction that the defendant is at fault. Thus, not all Gatecrasher cases have the 
same result.
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7.3.2 LRA and other views
Earlier in this chapter, I discuss several historical solutions to the Gatecrasher 
Paradox . I then argue that the solution LRA proposes aligns with what most scholars 
already think the outcome of the Gatecrasher should be. Prima facie, my last point 
may seem vapid, especially given the untold number of solutions that already reach 
the same conclusion that LRA comes to. What is unique, however, about LRA is that 
it can also illustrate the grounds for most of the proposed solutions in the literature. 
The next two Subsections illustrate how LRA can represent the Keynesian weight 
view as well as the injustice accounts.
7.3.2.1 LRA and Keynesian weight
Recall that according to the Keynesian weight view, cases that rely only on naked 
statistics suggest that the investigation was sloppy. Indeed, the cases claim that 
a serious investigation may not have been conducted. LRA can account for this 
assessment. We can imagine a scenario in which defendant is accused, tried, and 
convicted of gatecrashing based solely on base rate evidence. Defendant files for 
appeal and is given a hearing in appellate court. Suppose defendant argues that the 
decision of the lower court should be vacated on grounds that a serious investigation 
has not been conducted. Is not his defense a roundabout way of saying that not 
enough relevant alternatives have been ruled out? Indeed, suspicions of a shoddy 
investigation can often be attributed to hastily concluding that defendant is culpable 
before ruling out enough other persons of interest.
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7.3.2.2 LRA and Injustice accounts
LRA also has the resources to represent each justice view discussed in this chapter. 
Recall Glanville Williams holds that an injustice is done to the defendant who is found 
liable on the basis of bare statistics. We can think of a scenario in the Gatecrasher 
in which defendant complains of an injustice after being found liable of gatecrashing. 
He learns that the only evidence the plaintiff adduces is naked statistics. He then 
rightly complains that it would be an injustice to find him liable, given that the 
evidence is not specific to him.
Upon reflection, defendant’s contention is not unlike stating that a sufficient 
amount of relevant alternatives have not been ruled out. To claim that the evidence 
is not specific to the person is just to claim that the evidence does not uniquely 
pick out the person in question. But isn’t this just another way of saying that the 
evidence does not eliminate all other possible alternatives? That is, it is to claim 
that the evidence does not differentiate the target item from other alternatives. If 
my analysis is correct, then it should be noted that LRA can easily capture the idea 
of eliminating relevant alternatives.
Finally, LRA can illustrate that there can be scenarios in the Gatecrasher where 
it would be morally permissible to impose liability on defendant. To see this, I return 
to the Gatecrasher case with a few modications (hereafter, modified Gatecrasher). 
Suppose this time that there are 1,000,000 attendees, instead of 1,000. Futhermore, 
all but two of the attendees do not pay for admission. Similar to the original Gate-
crasher , let us assume that we just do not know which two attendees do pay. Suppose 
further that these bare statistics are all that is known about the case. If we assume
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that it is never perimissible to impose liability on a randomly selected spectator, it 
follows then that liability would not be imposed on any of the spectators.
On the other hand, the likelihood that the randomly selected spectator actually 
gatecrashed seems really high and consequently cannot be overlooked. If ever there 
was a naked statistical evidence case that justifies imposing liability, this seems 
like a good candidate. Indeed, we can even see Eggleston’s point. If the fact-finder 
chooses not to impose liability on any of the attendees because of qualms with relying 
on naked statistics, this can engender economic hardship on the plaintiff seeking 
to recover damages for the defendant’s alleged, wrongful conduct. Consequently, 
plaintiff may rightly claim that the economic hardship is tantamount to experiencing 
an injustice, especially if the fact-finder refrains from imposing on grounds that some 
may seem unfounded.
What is important to note, however, is that LRA can capture the concerns raised 
by Eggleston. To see this, let us ask what it would take, on LRA, for a randomly se-
lected spectator to be held liable for gatecrashing on the modified version. According 
to the theory, we ask the following question: Would a suciently high number of rel-
evant alternatives to the plaintiff’s narrative be eliminated were defendant accussed 
of gatecrashing? We might be tempted to think that LRA’s answer is no. However, 
this answer assumes that LRA requires all relevant alternatives to be eliminated 
in order to find for the plaintiff. However, such a standard is too exacting. LRA, 
instead, requires that a suciently high number of relevant alternatives be elimi-
nated. Given that there is a 99,998 to 1,000,000 chance (i.e., a 99.9% probability) 
that defendant is liable, there are prima facie grounds for LRA to arm that enough 
relevant altternatives have been eliminated. Furthermore, the high likelihood also
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suggests that not very many additional, yet conflicting, information, if presented,
would change the fact-finder’s belief that defendant is liable. Thus, LRA offers a
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